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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The notion of sustainable development has become central to global warming
policy debates. Despite heated international dialogue, there have been only modest
changes to curb greenhouse gas emissions on a global scale. This study explores a
controversial climate change mitigation model known as "cap and trade" by a first hand
investigation of two offset development projects in Central America. The paper calls for
greater transparency into emissions trading policies in an effort to show how carbon
offsetting has real world impacts on communities in the Global South.
This story examines a particular type of development work in Central America
that involve financial contributions from carbon offset providers. Financial contributions
from providers are exchanged for "emissions permits" generated by projects when
greenhouse gases are reduced or sequestered. These permits or "credits" allow the
emission of greenhouse gases (GHG). Each credit is equal to one ton of carbon dioxide or
GHG equivalent. This system of emissions trading formally began with the Kyoto
Protocol of 1997. However, the emissions trading model has roots as far back as 19901.
The main characters involved in emissions offsetting include governmental
organization, the United Nations (UN), multinational corporations, economists,
1 A more thorough history of the Kyoto Protocol and additional explanation may be obtained from:
http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/items/2830.php.
2development experts, grass roots organizations, communities and political figures
including Al Gore. The objective of the thesis is not to offer a new and striking look at
climate change mitigation policies, or to provide a new model of reform, but rather to
explore how carbon credits impact people in the Global South while at the same time
influencing development narratives in the Global North. Two development projects are
analyzed. Both projects take place in Central America. The names and locations of
organizations have been changed out of consideration for each group's anonymity. The
overarching hope is that the paper will contribute to greater transparency and foster
sustainable development solutions that work.
The notion of "sustainability" is a highly contested concept. This thesis will use
one of the most commonly used definitions of "sustainable development" drawn from the
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCEP). According to WCEP,
the term "sustainable development" is defined as "development that meets the needs of
the present while not compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs" (WCED, 1987;43).
The research topic began as an internship with an organization involved in the
voluntary carbon trading market. My fascination with this unique market-based scheme
continued despite multiple explanations from those involved in brokering transactions.
Questions evolved regarding the nature of pollution regulation and how best to address
global warming. An interest in the welfare of people-particularly those in marginalized
locations-was of central concern. Questions arose regarding the ways in which
international carbon offset development projects financed by carbon offsets affected local
3communities in the Global South. To answer these and other questions fIrst hand
observation was imperative.
Qualitative research methods are used to better understand development
practitioners and their projects designed to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Qualitative
methods include participant observation as well as structured and unstructured
interviews. Interviews with key participants were focused on illustrating how climate
change policies created in North America are affecting those living in the Global South.
The paper situates present cap and trade legislation into a historically framed
development discourse. To this effect, the overarching goal is to describe some of the
concrete effects of carbon dioxide emissions trading while at the same time suggest
connections to ongoing social and political trends. Before delving into the details of each
case study, a brief description of global warming policy will provide context for the
research fIndings.
The fIeldwork drew into question the legitimacy of cap in trade in general, and the
voluntary carbon market in particular. The answers to the study's original questions
became more complex during research on two types of carbon-offset projects in Latin
America. Both related to carbon capture and sequestration under the US voluntary
market. My fIndings suggest that signifIcant modifIcations to the present emissions
trading system are needed to foster greater social and environmental benefIts. Through
interviews and observation, the paper considers the carbon market's diverse impacts on
the social, environmental, and economic conditions of local populations in the Global
South.
4Voluntary Carbon Offsetting
The US releases approximately 21 % of global greenhouse gas emissions (Bayon,
Hawn, & Hamilton, 2009). A cost effective model of reducing greenhouse gases was
devised to address global warming. The model is known as the voluntary markee and is
the primary mechanism in the US' greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading scheme. The
system, originally modeled on an arguably successful acid rain mitigation program in the
US, uses market forces to create incentives for the reduction of sulfur dioxide emissions
(Kruger, 2007).
The present voluntary market uses a 'cap and trade' formula to reduce emissions
via trading GHG allowances or "credits." The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX)
"operates (as) North America's only cap and trade system for all six greenhouse gases
with global affiliates and projects worldwide" (2009). Created in 2003, the Chicago
Exchange represents 55% of voluntary trading: with the remaining 44% of carbon offset
purchases occurring over the counter to individuals (Stockholm Environmental Institute,
2009). For a variety of reasons, many interests in the US favor using the voluntary carbon
offset market to address climate change. Many of the present supporters of the US'
voluntary emissions trading model are in fact businesses that may be negatively impacted
the most from more rigorous systems of environmental regulation. Those organizations
that promote voluntary carbon offsetting include American Electric Power (AEP), one of
2 The term "Voluntary Market" refers to "the non-regulated market for carbon credits, especially Verified
Emissions Reductions (VERs) that operates independently from Kyoto and the ED ETS. Also called
the Non-Regulated Market" (Kollmuss, A., Zinc, H., & Polycarp, C., 2008;105).
5the largest power generators in the nation, and Pacificorp, a large electricity producer
headquartered in Portland, Oregon (Greenpeace, 2009).
The popularity of the CCX-and the voluntary market in general-is in the
system's unique approach towards emission reductions which occur without obstructing
the economic growth of the market (EPA, 2009). In essence, cap and trade is a capitalist
means of purportedly addressing global warming in the most cost effective manner, thus
avoiding disruption of development and business interests. Since the voluntary market's
inception, some politicians and US business interests continue to promote the scheme,
despite some criticism from the United Nations, the Global South, and environmentalists.
On the international stage, different sets of rules and regulations apply to the release of
greenhouse gases.
The United Nations created a separate cap and trade model for greenhouse gases
that the US has yet to ratify. This almost universally recognized scheme of addressing
global warming is known as the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol sets "binding targets for 37
industrialized countries and the European community for reducing greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions amount(ing) to an average of five per cent against 1990 levels over the
five-year period 2008-2012" (UNFCCC, 2009;1). Since the US has failed to fully
participate in international climate change agreements, the voluntary market functions as
a parallel commodities market that lies outside the parameters of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), yet purports to provide similar
environmental services.
6The international development work examined in this paper relates specifically to
the US' voluntary cap and trade model. Projects falling within the voluntary market
create 'carbon credits' largely through development work in the Global South. Since
inception, the entire market has grown rapidly with "trading on the voluntary Chicago
Climate Futures Exchange more than doubling in contract volume since the first half of
2008. Trading volumes are also rising quickly on Climate Exchange's London platform"
(Kirkland, 2009).
The voluntary market functions by allowing the creation of a series of tradable
emissions permits which allow industries and individuals to continue to release harmful
emissions if development projects are created to "offset" or otherwise neutralize total
global greenhouse gas emissions. The size of the voluntary market is largely unknown
because many transactions take place over the counter and go unreported. Nevertheless,
the voluntary market has grown by about 200% between 2005 and 2006 with over 150
voluntary carbon offset retailers globally (Lovell, Bulkeley, & Liverman, 2009 in press).
Experts believe the size of the voluntary market represented US $397 million dollars in
total emission sales in 2008 (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2009).
Other estimates of the size of the voluntary market place the number as high as
US $700 million dollars in 2008 (Bayon, Hawn, & Hamilton, 2007). By comparison, the
UNFCCC regulated market is far larger and has increased "for a total volume of more
than one billion (Certified Emission Reductions) CERs transacted for a value of US $26.3
billion" in 2008 (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2009;37). In both voluntary and compliance
markets emission permits are predominantly purchased by developed nations in the
7Global North while projects occur largely in the Global South.
Offset projects may take the form of solar, wind, improved wood stoves,
afforestation, reforestation, or a host of other sustainable mechanisms for reducing
emissions deemed as 'legitimate' sources of carbon financing under the Chicago Climate
Exchange (CCX). The exchange mimics the UN's compliance market however does not
have the same binding restrictions. The voluntary market may serve to assist, or detract
from, real world efforts to address climate change since global policies, particularly those
relating to energy, do not take place within a vacuum. On a macro scale, issues of
sustainability and the right to pollute the 'atmospheric commons' are situated within
overarching historical power relationships between the Global North and South.
Western industrialized nations produce the largest share of greenhouse gas
emissions. Similarly, political representatives from Northern countries have been
disproportionately responsible for creating global development policies aimed at reducing
greenhouse gases. If the atmosphere is a common resource shared by all than there is a
question of shared responsibility within climate change policy. In other words, there is a
need to include a diverse and proportional set of voices from developing nations and from
those who hold alternative notions of the meaning of the term sustainable development.
Disparities between rich and poor nations remain the principle factor that allows
voluntary offset projects to remain profitable within a globalized, market-based economy.
The myriad differences between the two hemispheres provide benefits to carbon offset
developers interested in cheaper labor, lax environmental restrictions, regulatory
requirements, and technological differences (WWF, 2008). These key differences
8outlined by the WWF play prominently into the functionality and profitability of the
voluntary cap and trade market as a cost effective means of reducing total global
emISSiOns.
The paper explores North-South power dynamics through the lens ofNGOs
involved in carbon financed development projects. The impetus for this work is to create
greater transparency within the voluntary market and shift the discourse of global
warming policy from an obscure framework to a more readily understandable
development model. Carbon offsetting is portrayed as a means of cutting the cost of
emission reductions while "preserv(ing) jobs and US competitiveness" (Climate Care,
2009). However, what is not often available-to consumers and policy makers-is first
hand descriptions of emission reduction projects. On the ground investigations of these
projects simplify the theoretical nature of carbon offsetting and may illuminate
challenges to the system not otherwise available to outside observers.
The paper makes several assertions about the voluntary market. First, the US cap
and trade system must become more transparent and equitable for all actors before the
American public should consider the model as a legitimate means of protecting the
earth's atmosphere. Additionally, outside researchers and not only climate change experts
should be able to qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate emissions trading projects in
the developing world to ensure transparency. Proof of the voluntary market's authenticity
and benefits should be evaluated on a social as well as environmental level by engaging
local communities in which offset projects occur. Finally, the overarching goal ofthe
voluntary market is to prevent harmful climate change that threatens the continuation of
9many life forms on the planet. Therefore, the voluntary market must be evaluated in
relation to the more international model of the Kyoto Protocol set to expire in 2012.
The next series of United Nations Climate Change Conference talks will be held
in Copenhagen, Denmark beginning on December 7,2009. The conference promises to
be a defining moment in climate change policy history particularly for the United States
which until recently had rejected the Kyoto Protocol under the Bush Administration.
However, the Obama Administration has since rejoined UN's climate change talks,
generating high hopes among some United Nations delegates (UNFCCC, 2009). The US
government's role may soon shift dramatically with massive impacts on the voluntary
market in the coming months.
Case Study 1: Wood Stove Project Overview
The first development project case study takes place in Central America. The
development organization is a locally owned NGO involved in voluntary carbon
offsetting via improved efficiency wood burning home cook stoves. Appropriate
technology improved stoves reduce greenhouse gases while decreasing fuel use and
carbon dioxide emissions by increasing combustion efficiency (Smith, 1999). The project
under review quantifies emission savings, translates these savings into carbon credits, and
then sells the credits as a commodity on the Chicago Climate Exchange. In addition to
emissions savings, stoves have the added benefit of improving indoor air quality,
reducing infant mortality, and adult morbidity (Baldwin, 1987). Improved stoves improve
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human health and reduce environmental impacts by reducing fuel use (Moberg, 2004;
Haines & Kammen, 2000; Biran & Hunt, 2003; Baldwin, 1987; Smith, 1999).
The voluntary carbon market has often leveraged support for improved stove
projects by employing the use of narratives that illustrate how stoves improve the lives of
those in the Global South. These "narratives" commodify improved stoves and other
offset projects with social significance as well as environmental benefits. Carbon dealers
may promote a carbon offset project by making use of an uplifting storyline involving
reducing emissions while improving quality of life for those in developing nations.
Businesses and individuals who choose to purchase carbon credits may in turn
promote their enterprises as socially and environmentally conscious. This allows the use
of positive project narratives to travel from one entity to the next, far from the location of
the original project. Processes of production, distribution, and consumption sanitize and
compartmentalize carbon commodities by maintaining a separation between the methods
and means of production from consumer markets. There is therefore a need for greater
transparency into the production of carbon offsets as a commodity. Development
narratives used in marketing this new product must be unpackaged to determine validity.
Carbon offset brokers use narratives of social and environmental change as
essential components "to reassure consumers about what it is they are buying, given the
absence of both a tangible product and regulatory standards (Lovell et aI., 2009;2 in
press). Additionally, the use of these stories reifies carbon credits in an attempt to
"negotiate (an) interface between consumers and the 'social1ife' of the commodity,
allowing emissions offsets to take on meaning and value (Bryant and Goodman, 2004;
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348). In essence, carbon offset commodities are constructed "solutions" based on a
market based approach to addressing dangerous climate change (Liverman, 2009). At the
root of carbon trading and the constructed notion of carbon offsets lies a specific situated
knowledge system based on capitalism and privatization.
The commodification of carbon credits directly relates to what Karl Marx termed
"commodity fetishism" and the way in which objects take on new meanings through
social interactions and exchange. Marx describes the fetishism of commodities as
"products of the labor of private individuals or groups of individuals who carryon their
work independently of each other" (Marx, 1990;162). In essence, products take on new
meanings through the separation of production and consumption processes. Individual
consumers fetishize carbon credits as symbols of environmental protection, humanitarian
acts, or markers of progressive social status. Marx's commodity fetishism is predicated
on the notion that product consumers and producers remain separated from one another.
This departmentalization of labor allows work in one area to remain both magical
and obscure to those outside. However, when we lift the vale of obscurity from voluntary
carbon credits a landscape appears which closely resembles the top down development
paradigm of the past 50 years, with a green border. The paper examines two projects at
their source to ensure that commodity fetishism does not obscure the realities of carbon
financed development. At present, third party verification is an essential component of
many offset projects though there has yet to be a universal standard of measuring
environmental impact.
The first case study examines several foundational notions within carbon
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emissions offsetting to determine if the particular development offset project under
review would have occurred without carbon financing. There are often unseen
complications that influence both the auditing and financing process. The stove project
was reviewed three years after receiving funding from a carbon financer. Individual stove
units had been subsidized and sold to consumers at a diminished cost. The carbon
subsidization reduced the original stove price by approximately US $6 dollars or
approximately 5% of the total value of the stove3•
The contract between the broker and development agency suddenly ended two
years before the project' agreed upon completion date. The carbon broker's reasons for
severing the contract are unknown. However, a possible cause for the contractual
termination could be due to the nature of the voluntary offset market. In recent years
carbon offset companies have moved away from sponsoring certain types of high-risk
projects including improved wood stoves. In the words of one offset organization
manager, "community-based fuel stove projects are more rounded and embedded in
culture and trying to explain that to people (customers) .. .is challenging ...people want to
know where their money is going" (Lovell, Bulkeley, & Liverman 2009; 19 in press). In
response to consumer demand, carbon brokers have decided to focus on projects that are
easier to sell to potential customers. The factors described above may have influenced the
offset company's decision to withdraw support.
Irrespective ofthe underlying reasons for the stove project's loss offinancial
backing, the carbon credits generated in the initial phases of the project were sold on the
3 The total value of improved stoves varied slightly based on model. However, the most commonly
produced model retailed for approximately US $130 dollars.
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Chicago Climate Exchange and over-the-counter to individual consumers. This project
will be addressed in detail in subsequent chapters to illustrate fundamental challenges to
the voluntary market, that of accountability.
Carbon offsets are intangible commodities often produced overseas yet sold in the
US. Buyers are usually unaware of contractual violations due to the sanitized and
compartmentalized nature of the carbon market. The scenario is a theoretically logical
environmental approach to addressing climate change with a number of flaws that will be
addressed in later chapters. Apart from the fundamental flaws inherent to cap and trade
policies, international forestry and stove projects may initially benefit from carbon
finance and have beneficial social and environmental impacts.
Development organizations operating projects are exposed to legal and PR
backlash if outcomes do not meet theoretical carbon offset expectations4• Additionally,
development organizations may suffer the consequences of a disillusioned public wary of
fraud if project legitimacy is suspect due to substandard carbon accounting practices.
This case study illustrates certain vulnerabilities within the current voluntary carbon
trading system and presents several possible ways project risks may be reduced.
Case Study 2: Afforestation Project Overview
The second case study documents an afforestation project that plants only native
tree species on degraded land in efforts to sequester carbon dioxide. Native dry rainforest
4 Development organizations become burdened by significant legal and ethical responsibilities. The power
disparity between carbon brokers from the developed world and NGO from the developing world foster an
unequal situation that will be addressed in later chapters of this work.
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is protected along the Costa Rican border of Nicaragua while carbon offsets are produced
after an annual survey. The small organization focuses on community building by calling
on local and non-local experts. The organization also fosters working relationships with
landowners and adjacent communities. The development work termed "afforestation"
employs the "biological services" of trees to function as "carbon sinks" absorbing
greenhouse gases via carbon sequestration5. Since carbon dioxide absorption occurs over
the lifetime of a tree the project assists carbon financers in the present to foster long-term
sustainability. An analysis of a different type of afforestation work is provided besides
examining the previously described project.
The second project sponsored by the World Bank documents carbon offset
afforestation via industrial forest monocultures. Both afforestation projects are
considered. Questions of local access to resources, the dangers of fortress-style
conservation and the political economy of place are also addressed within the context of
both case studies. The paper seeks to identifY environmentally sustainable forestry
practices that consider the equitable distribution of resources. The voluntary carbon
trading market is situated within a discussion of local community access to land.
The overarching goal of the paper is to encourage policies that benefit the
"atmospheric commons" while ensuring equitable distribution of environmental and
economic resources for those living in the Global South. Essentially, the premise of cap
and trade reifies the earth's atmosphere as a commodity with market value. Largely
overlooked by the market driven approach to climate change are power disparities
5 Sequestration refers to the capturing of carbon dioxide in a way that does not allow the greenhouse gas
from being released into the atmosphere for a specified period of time (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2009).
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inherent to Global North-South relations. The paper uses first-hand real-world examples
to illustrate how the present system of emissions trading is a fundamentally flawed
system requiring replacement by more equitable environmental models.
Research Design and Parameters
This thesis will not address UN-sponsored international global warming
initiatives under the regulated emissions trading market and the Kyoto Protocol's Clean
Development Mechanisms (CDM). The study focuses on the US voluntary market based
on primary data collected from two offset projects located in Central America. Global
emissions trading mechanisms are divided into regulated and voluntary markets with
unique features. The regulated emissions marketplace occurs under the supervision and
control of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC,
2009). Many businesses and individuals in the USA use the voluntary carbon market due
to the US government's reluctance to ratify the UN-sponsored Kyoto Protocol and more
recent global climate change mitigation strategies. The United Kingdom and Australia
have similar national models though both approaches fit under the umbrella of the Kyoto
Protocol's compliance market (UNFCCC, 2009).
There were several reasons that contribute to the project's limited scope. The
sheer scale and complexity of emissions regulations surrounding global warming
mitigation policies prohibits a thorough analysis. Further, there are limits to the types of
information accessible through literary review. It was necessary to conduct first hand
16
investigation due to the nature of the research question or risk a project that is a mile
wide and an inch deep.
The thesis addresses an important gap in research on carbon offsets. Scholarly
articles often discuss the negative and positive attributes of carbon credits from a purely
theoretical framework. Literature available online and through print may afford an in
depth understanding of the rules and regulations of markets and the climate science to
prove or disprove the legitimacy of emissions trading. However, there is need for first
hand accounts of carbon offset projects based on field research to substantiate existing
literature on the subject.
Additionally, the specific relationship between improved cook stoves and
voluntary carbon finance has not received significant scholarly attention. This may be
due to the challenge of accurately calculating improved stove project carbon savings
because variability exists in monitoring and household use patterns (Bumpus and
Liverman, 2008;135). Research examined the challenges and opportunities of offset
projects within the voluntary market via a number of methods including methane capture,
dam construction, and tree planting (Kollmuss, Zink, & Polycarp, 2008; David Suzuki
Foundation, 2008; Bayon, Hawn, & Hamilton, 2009).
Improved stoves have received significant scholarly attention as mechanisms in
reducing fuel consumption, particulate matter and as a means of mitigating some ofthe
impacts of indoor air pollution on human health (Baldwin, 1987; Smith, 1999; Biran &
Hunt, 2003; Barnes, Openshaw, Smith & van der Plas, 1994). Nevertheless, there has
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been little scholarly literature on the role of cook stoves in the voluntary cap and trade
market.
There are several reasons why improved stove projects may come to occupy a
larger role in mitigating greenhouse gases under a cap and trade framework. Even with
the significant hurdles to large-scale project adoption, improved stoves may be on the
verge of increased notoriety due to a variety of factors. A front-page article in the New
York Times on April 15, 2009 asserted that soot or "black carbon" produced from the
combustion of wood and biomass may be responsible for approximately 18% of total
greenhouse gases released. This claim-that about one fifth of climate change is due to
smoke-was made by Dr. Veerabhadan Ramanathan one of the world's most prominent
climate scientists (Rosenthal, 2009). This statistic would mean that black carbon's impact
would rank second only to carbon dioxide (C02) as a leading cause of global warming.
C02 accounts for approximate 40% of climate change and is the leading cause of global
warmmg.
Improved cook stoves are effective mechanisms in reducing black carbon.
However, increased efficiency cook stoves were not considered "Clean Development
Mechanisms" (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol until recently. Development projects that
use stoves have therefore been ineligible to receive funding under the UNFCCC's
compliance market. There are several potential reasons that biomass home cook stoves
have not been used in the compliance market. These reasons include: project complexity,
high levels of risk in conjunction with the significant cost of meeting CDM requirements,
and the relatively small scale of stove projects (Household Energy Network, 2007).
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Another reason for stove project marginalization within the regulated market is
that emissions testing protocols have yet to become institutionally standardized.
However, institutional "irregularities" are being addressed, and stove projects are
nevertheless currently being utilized by the voluntary market (Harris, 2007). As
increasing numbers of countries take steps to address climate change, improved cook
stoves may become accepted in the compliance marketplace.
Discussions surrounding climate change policies have become central to the
public's awareness and interests (Ott, 2001). However, agreement has not yet been
reached on how best to address the potentially catastrophic challenges of global climate
change. The US government's staunch decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol of 1997,
calling for reductions in greenhouse gases by 7 percent of 1990 levels in the US, has
placed our nation in a unique position. President George W. Bush asserted that the US
government "would not continue participating in negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, and
would develop an alternative approach" (Fletcher, 2004;5). The alternative system of
addressing climate change became known as the voluntary market. This model functions
primarily in the US by funding offset projects in the developing world.
The Bush Administration asserted several arguments against US involvement in
international climate change talks. The Kyoto Protocol placed unfair restrictions on US
industrial greenhouse gas emissions. The United States would ratify the Protocol only
when other powerful industrial nations, including Brazil, China, Russia, and India, were
also similarly beholden to mandatory caps on greenhouse gas emissions. The negative
economic impact of being legally bound to emissions reductions was too great an
19
economic burden for the US to bear. In an official press release, President Bush justified
the decision not to ratify the Protocol arguing that,
This (climate change) is a challenge that requires a 100 percent effort; ours, and
the rest of the world's. The world's second-largest emitter of greenhouse gases is
China. Yet, China was entirely exempted from the requirements of the Kyoto
Protocol. India and Germany are among the top emitters. Yet, India was also
exempt from Kyoto. These and other developing countries that are experiencing
rapid growth face challenges in reducing their emissions without harming their
economies. We want to work cooperatively with these countries in their efforts to
reduce greenhouse emissions and maintain economic growth (White House Press
Release, 2001).
This paper primarily addresses the voluntary market created in the wake of the US
decision not to participate in the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Before delving into
detail in the case studies, it is necessary to first understand how global warming became a
central issue with far reaching environmental, political, and economic ramifications. To
contextualize this qualitative study of the social impacts of climate change mitigation
projects the paper investigates how the voluntary cap and trade model works on the
ground.
Proponents of the voluntary cap and trade system argue that the planting of trees,
among other offsets is a legitimate means of absorbing C02 from the atmosphere. Carbon
dioxide emissions are calculated by third party verifiers and are intended to ensure
accuracy and legitimacy. These outside auditors are intended to provide transparency to
projects by proving among other things that projects would not have occurred had offset
financing not been present.
Another role of auditors is to ensure that credits will not be sold to multiple
buyers. Larry Lohmann of the research and solidarity organization The Corner House
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raises a key criticism of third party verifiers. Lohmann states that verifiers "have little
incentive to question the effectiveness of the carbon projects they work on, since to do so
would be to jeopardize their chances of getting future work. It could also jeopardize their
relationships with their other clients (corporations)" (2006;61). There are also challenges
that must be addressed on a theoretical level.
The Cap and Trade Debate
Literature on carbon offsetting often oversimplifies the topic by either promoting
or refuting the cap and trade model. Critiques from opponents of the voluntary market
often frame cap and trade as a 'band-aid' solution that fails to address current resource
use patterns. According to the David Suzuki Foundation, tree planting projects are
problematic for a number of reasons including; lack of permanence, methodological
uncertainties surrounding quantifying carbon sequestration in trees, lack of additionality6,
and the lack of fundamental change to present systems of resource use.
Other challenges to carbon-based forestry offsets include uncertainty surrounding
the quantity of carbon dioxide sequestered and inability to argue for trees as permanent
offsets due to unexpected fire, disease, logging, or lack of sufficient land to plant enough
trees to mitigate impacts. Further, some scientific evidence points to forests as sources of
carbon emissions due to the impact of global warming on tree mortality and morbidity
(Suzuki,2009).
6 The term "additionality" is central to the debate over cap and trade. The term is defined according to the
Kyoto Protocol, as emission reductions generated by Clean Development Mechanism and Joint
Implementation project activities that must be 'additional' to those that otherwise would occur.
Additionality is established when there is a positive difference between the emissions that occur in the
baseline scenario, and the emissions that occur in the proposed project (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2009).
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The notion of 'additiona1ity' has also been a point of contention for critics who
believe it difficult or impossible to prove (Greenpeace, 2009; Lohmann, 2006). To show
additiona1ity, the developer must prove that the project would not have occurred had it
not been for the financial contributions for carbon offsets. The question used to determine
additionality is: would this development project have happened anyway? If the project
would not have occurred, then the project is additional (Carbon Finance, 2009). The
question of additionality remains challenging for a variety of reasons. Many afforested
lands should have been replanted after they were originally cut, but were not (Lohmann,
2006).
There is great difficulty in determining the likelihood that a development project
would, or would not, have occurred in the future had there not been financial
contributions from carbon offset companies. To establish 'additionality,' a hypothetical
scenario must be developed with the specific goal of convincing the reader that offset
money is essential for project inception. The underlying objectives of carbon offset
additionality reports are to demonstrate the need for carbon-financed development
(Lohmann, 2006). There may be conflicts of interest because there is an unspoken
monetary incentive for companies to create scenarios that earn more money. Further, the
Kyoto Protocol has a specific means of calculating additionality. However, the voluntary
market has a variety of metrics with varying degrees of standardization. Besides issues of
additionality, other factors are often not considered within the voluntary market.
Large-scale forestry monocrops, planted and maintained with fossil fuel inputs,
have been tied to biodiversity loss. Importantly, these projects do not fundamentally alter
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current modes of economic production responsible for climate change, but rather shift
development narratives to function within a carbon emissions trading system. At the time
of writing, the World Bank was funding an afforestation project in a region close to the
site of the second case study: 600 hectares of teak plantations were planted on degraded
land, formerly cattle pastures. The Bank provides funding to Precious Woods Holdings
Ltd., a Swiss-based multinational corporation. Armando E. Guzman, a World Bank
environmental specialist overseeing the project asserted that "this project is helping to
make communities the beneficiaries of the carbon finance market.. .it is an important
pilot program for the Bank, for Nicaragua and for the region" (World Bank, 2008). This
project' affects on local Nicaraguan communities has yet to be determined. Regional
employment opportunities-an initial benefit of the project-may be weighed against the
long term negative impacts of large-scale monocrops on water resources, worker
exposure to dangerous pesticides, and reduced biodiversity.
In essence, the project's long term affects may have adverse consequences for
local communities irrespective of the World Bank's rhetoric focusing on employment and
economic production. Voluntary carbon credits often provide afforestation projects with
revenue irrespective of environmental and social impacts. In other words, great
variability exists in forestry based carbon capture projects. The Gold Standard (GS)
voluntary trading scheme purports to have a 'triple bottom line' of social, economic and
environmental benefits. However, the Gold Standard is only one of myriad voluntary
markets (Gold Standard, 2009). Irrespective of a lack of transparency, the voluntary
market continues to encourage existing wealth disparities by offering new forms of
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financial and ecological compensation to multinational corporations. Socially and
environmentally popular narratives purporting to address climate change may simply
greenwash conventional top-down development practices.
Offsetting Responsibility: Climate Change Policy Maintains Business as Usual
Many critics of cap and trade argue that both voluntary and regulated systems of
cap and trade are fundamentally flawed. Some criticism centers on the cap and trade
model slowing the inevitable shift in resources use patterns towards clean energy
technologies. Carbon offsetting allows industries-and conscientious consumers-to
continue polluting legally and guilt free (Smith, 2007). This critique would argue that
emissions trading schemes simply maintain business as usual at the expense of the
environment.
Other concerns challenge carbon emission metrics, verification of "additionally"
or encouraging "fortress style conservation" by denying the landless poor access to
resources via forest based "carbon sinks." Other critics claim that the offset market is
simply 'token environmentalism' or 'Enron environmentalism' and is an intellectually
dishonest mechanism for greenwashing global warming (Lohmann, 2006).
This thesis asserts that the above-mentioned concerns are valid and substantiates
several of these criticisms in first person data collection of offset projects in Central
America. Both development projects surveyed were beneficially influencing the
environment and adjacent communities. However, the carbon financing that both
organizations received was not necessary for these NGOs. Rather, the money from
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carbon credits unequally benefited the corporate donors and left the organizations in
vulnerable positions.
Despite criticism, many environmental groups continue to promote the voluntary
cap and trade system as a pragmatic means of slowing global warming. The World Wide
Fund for Nature (WWF), a large Swiss-based environmental group, is a key proponent of
carbon trading, and even launched its own voluntary standard, called the 'Gold Standard'
in 2003, in conjunction with another NGO (Lovell, Bulkeley, & Liverman, 2009 in
press). The organization describes the benefits of offsetting within the voluntary market
as:
Allow(ing) for experimentation and innovation because projects can be
implemented with fewer transaction costs than CDM or other compliance market
projects. Voluntary markets also serve as a niche for micro projects that are too
small to warrant the administrative burden of CDM or for projects currently not
covered under compliance schemes (WWF, 2008;6).
The statement seems to take a practical approach to environmental protection. The
WWF recognizes that Kyoto sponsored Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects
are often prohibitively expensive and bureaucratic thereby delaying real change.
Therefore, immediate action is needed. Despite the risks, the global community must
support new and complex methodologies of reducing emissions due to the severity of the
climate crisis. This approach to environmentalism is at best pragmatic, at worst
intellectually dishonest. The decision for environmental groups to participate in voluntary
carbon offset projects is problematic. Significant literature reveals fundamental market
failures due to the cap and trade model of emission reductions.
On a theoretical level, the basic components exists for what James Ferguson has
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termed the 'anti-politics machine.' Ferguson's 1994 book, The Anti-Politics Machine:
'Development, ' Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, was a foundational
text in exploring how issues of power can easily be applied to carbon-financed
development. In essence, proponents of carbon offsets claim the threat of global warming
is so dire that there is no room for dissent. Further, the 'carbon financed development
model' of emissions trading dismisses valid criticism from those outside the system.
Ferguson commented on the development apparatus and the "experts" that attempted to
control development discourse and marginalize local and contradictory opinions through
the reification of systems of knowledge. The anti-politics machine can be applied to
carbon financed development with its array of experts, auditors, and industry jargon that
largely silence public criticism through the metaphysical construction of 'development
narratives. '
At the time of writing, there has been no clear consensus among environmental
groups as to the best means of approaching global warming policy. On the contrary,
increasing numbers of voluntary carbon "standards" are emerging. For example, the huge
multinational investment bank Morgan Stanley designed the Voluntary Offset Standard in
2007 (Morgan Stanley, 2007). Other businesses have created their own carbon standards
complete with diverse methodologies and legitimacy criteria.
The Climate Group-a consortium of industry and business interests-launched a
voluntary carbon offset model called the "Voluntary Carbon Standard" in November of
2007 (The Climate Group, 2007). The many so-called standards within the voluntary
market have created a maze of complex and varying regulations with no overarching
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standardization, regulation, or accountability. This system of competing 'standards'
fosters complexity, lacks governmental regulation, and may detract from overall efforts
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Further, competing standards significantly reduce
the public's ability to determine legitimacy and provide environmental and social
oversight to multinational carbon transactions.
Business operations-in the voluntary emissions trading market-go largely
unregulated by US governmental oversight. The voluntary market' lack of institutional
transparency is underplayed by free market enthusiasts who may benefit from the model.
Special interest groups-including sunset industries such as coal and oil industries-
assert that cap and trade is the most feasible and cost effective model of addressing
dangerous climate change. However, numerous compelling arguments by public and
private sector agencies, not to mention communities in the developing world, question if
emissions trading schemes are sufficiently transparent or environmentally sustainable in
the long term. One US government report discussed below addresses issues of regulation
and legitimacy within the voluntary market.
We Could Have Saved the World but We Were Too Cheap
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report in August
of 2008 titled, "Carbon offsets; The voluntary market is growing, but quality assurance
poses challenges for market participants." The work made several key observations
about the state of the US voluntary carbon trading market. Many of the observations were
in the form of concerns and included a lack of standardization in quality assurance
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mechanisms and a non-central trading platform challenging market transparency. Other
concerns included: insufficient information provided to consumers, problems determining
additionality, inadequate governmental oversight, and uncertain environmental impact
(2008;37). The report seemed critical of many aspects of the voluntary market although
no executive action was called for. Instead, congress is directed to consider the creation
of a "standardized quality assurance mechanism" (United States Government
Accountability Office, GAO 2008).
Other reports also question the viability and long-term vision of emissions
trading. The International Energy Agency (lEA) is an intergovernmental organization
created after the oil crisis in 1974 to foster sustainable supplies of energy for the world's
needs (lEA, 2009). The lEA recently published an article titled, "The World Energy
Outlook 2009." The document is concerned with issues of energy sustainability and is
responsible for promoting growth while at the same time encouraging the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions through alternative fuels. In a letter to the lEA on October 15,
2009, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Yvo de Boer, praised the lEA in summarizing the article's findings:
To delay (action on climate change) would only increase costs. Indeed, the report
shows that every year of delay adds 500 billion dollars more to the cost of
reaching the 450-ppm (parts per million) reference scenario of the report. This is
partly due to technology lock-in effects. The power plants that are built today
determine the CO2 emissions for a generation. This makes it all the more
important to ensure that low-emissions investments are made now. And once
investments do start to pick up again, it is of utmost importance that they will be
steered into a low-emissions direction (UNFCCC, 2009).
These statements show that many energy experts recognize the need to make
radical changes to the ways in which energy is generated. In addition, key is the
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perceived eminent need to change policy out of economic, as well as environmental need.
In essence, sustainable sources of energy must be rapidly developed from a pragmatic
cost-benefit analysis standpoint. Voluntary carbon offsetting is critiqued throughout the
paper because, although carbon accounting strategies theoretically make sense, emissions
reductions are not guaranteed. To ensure carbon reductions and to foster more certain
sustainability practices, Yvo de Boer goes on to say that:
The report shows that the cost of changing direction would not only be
reasonable, but that energy efficiency and other savings could largely offset the
total investment required. The report shows that achieving the 450 scenario
requires additional investments, but that the costs are manageable (UNFCCC,
2009;2).
This idea that sustainable energy production is both essential for future
environmental wellbeing and cost efficient in the long term seems to be a straightforward
notion. Yet, barriers exist to shifting energy use patterns. The legislation of the voluntary
carbon trading market, although loosely based on Kyoto Protocol's CDM legislation, was
constructed by those entities with economic interests in forming weak climate change
policy. One organization composed of large corporations is called the Voluntary Carbon
Standard (VCS). The VCS supports emissions trading within the voluntary carbon market
and attempts to play the role of the Ul\TFCCC in overseeing offset projects. According to
the VCS, the organization:
Undertakes a variety of activities, including, but not limited to, the accreditation
rules for Validators and Verifiers operating under the VCS, the approval process
for recognition of other GHG Programs, supervision of the VCS Project Database,
and the conditions for approval ofVCS Registries7.
7 The ves quote was copied from the official ves website at: http://www.v-c-s.org/faq.html#questionl.
Accessed on October 28,2009.
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The VCS organization represents one of the many consolidated business interests
attempting to become the 'standard' of measuring projects under the voluntary market
system. According to some scholars, "the international standard seen as most likely to
become the market leader is the Voluntary Carbon Standard" (Lovell, Bulkeley, &
Liverman, 2009 in press). The voluntary market contains powerful interests that have a
vested stake in maintaining carbon trading in the US and abroad.
Proponents of the system have made efforts to increase legitimacy in the eyes of
the public and private sector. Attempts to "standardize" the market have been funded by
such entities including the investment bank Goldman Sachs, DNV a multinational
insurance firm, Invista a plastic and polymer manufacturer, Interface the world's largest
manufacturer of carpet, and the British Petroleum corporation (BP). If the market
continues to function as a de facto model of addressing global warming, this will likely
result in justifying pollution emissions and generating profits for those involved in carbon
as a commodity.
These corporations listed above have clear interests and specific political projects
that underlie efforts to lobby political representatives and support legislation that
maintains the voluntary carbon offset market. Leading up to the 2009 post-Kyoto
Copenhagen talks global climate change legislation is continues to be constructed.
Throughout this crucial period, there is need for other voices including environmental,
labor, indigenous, and poor movements to advocate for alternate policies that promote
models of climate change that are more populist and benefit those who will experience
the most devastating impacts of climate change.
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According to the environmental organization, Friends of the Earth, heavy
industrial polluters often gain windfall profits from cap and trade legislation. Corporate
profits may take the form of the US government giving massive subsidies to heavy
industries. There are specific cases of corporate profiteering within the arena of climate
change legislation. The Lieberman-Warner bill-also known as America's Climate
Security Act of 2007-was a cap and trade model of addressing climate change.
The bill provided the hydrocarbon industry approximately $800 billion in
emission subsidies with nearly half a trillion dollars allocated directly to the fossil fuel
industries and over half of this money going to the coal industry (Friends of the Earth,
2007;3). Under the legislation, nuclear power also received heavy government subsidies.
The Lieberman-Warner bill was defeated on June 6, 2008 largely due to criticism from
both Republican and Democratic lawmakers (Pooley, 2008). Regardless of the bill's
failure, the legislation essentially tested the waters for future legislation (Cohen, 2007).
Although atomic energy has proven to be a costly and environmentally dangerous
endeavor, some continue to support the proliferation of nuclear power as an alternative to
greenhouse gas emitting energy production. Key questions regarding the nature of the
voluntary market must be posed. Is the privatization of the atmosphere commons-in the
name of protecting the world's climate-leading to greater economic and environmental
vulnerability for local communities in developing nations? Conversely, are offset projects
providing needed livelihoods for residents and encouraging sustainable resource use
practices through forest protection? The answers to these questions are complex and need
case-by-case analysis. However, research findings point to cap and trade as an
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exceedingly complex model unconducive to transparency or accountability.
One aim of this thesis is to foster greater transparency within the present system
and further the public's role in ensuring feasible solutions to addressing climate change
become available. Policies addressing global warming have the potential to distribute
wealth and resources in fundamentally different ways depending on which models are
accepted into international law. I view my role as a third party observer who seeks to
address possible shortcomings or conflicts of interest in the creation of legislation that
will affect those in both the Global North and South. Information from the thesis will be
made available to those development agencies whose work employs stove projects. The
data collected and described in this thesis increases transparency and informs the public
of emerging trends in global climate change policies.
The late author Kurt Vonnegut Jr. once reflected that, "we could have saved the
world but we were too cheap." The statement may have been a reference to the seemingly
universal human propensity to prioritize short-term gain over long term sustainable
resource use. Based on the research in this paper, relying on market mechanisms for
environmentally sustainable solutions to climate change is at best overoptimistic, at worst
apocalyptic. This assertion is supported by unsustainable resource use patterns
perpetuated by market mechanisms whose profit margins trump environmental and social
considerations.
Numerous national and international development projects use carbon financing.
The following graph provides examples of projects that are currently receiving partial
funding through greenhouse gas reduction efforts. Some types of projects are considered
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legitimate under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol while others
only qualify under the more lax voluntary market.
Table 1. Carbon Offset Market. This table provides an cursory view of several common
types of emission reduction or sequestration projects. The table is not intended to be
comprehensive only show the reader examples of prices, verifiers, and companies.
Carbon Offset Provider Price/ton Project Type CDM Voluntary 3m Party
Verifer(s)
Vems Carbon Neutral 2.75USD Varies No Yes CCX~
CarbonFund.org 10USD Reforestation Yes Yes CCX,CDM
LiveNeutral.org 12USD Efficiency No Yes CCX
Standard Carbon 15USD Methane No Yes CCX
TerraPass 14USD Renewables No Yes CCX
Bonneville Envir. Found. 29USD Renewables No Yes Green-e Climate
Enpalo 19U5D Varies Yes Yes Gold Standard,
CDM
The great degree of variability within the market price for carbon credits (USD
$2.75 - 19) exemplifies the range of consumer options for emission offset projects. As
previously described there is often great variability in the "quality" of emission
reductions with some projects having significant differences in additionality,
transparency, and standardization variables. Interesting responses were revealed when the
US Government Accountability Office (GAO) surveyed project stakeholders. The GAO
8 Note: "CCX" refers to the voluntary market of the Chicago Climate Exchange. A full definition of the
term may be found in the appendix of this work.
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asked market participants how they perceived the quality of emission reduction projects.
The following chart shows the results of the government's survey cross-referenced by
offset type.
Table 2. Stakeholder Credibility Ratings. The table below is an example of the perceived
legitimacy of carbon offsets based on project type.
How erodible. If at
art {s ttaeft typo of
prolect?
(2}
{OJ Not at {t} Slightly ModilratQly (3) Vory {4l E.xlrm'l'\i}ly
all erodible erodible cwdib/& crOOlble eredlbltJ
{)on't
koowl
Varies unsulll
enerq'1
certJflcalea (Hee)
The graph above was taken from page Sl of the article "CARBON OFFSETS: The U.S. Voluntary Market
Is Growing, but Quality Assurance Poses Challenges for Market Participants" by Stephenson, J. (2008).
GAO-08-1048 Highlights.
This table indicates that agricultural methane capture was considered the most
reliable means of reducing emissions (receiving an average score of 3.41 out of 4 points),
compared to rangeland soil carbon sequestration (1.81 out of 4). Afforestation project
credibility was slightly better than average at 2.5. Of note is that the GAO received the
above information from the voluntary market's primary trading platfonn the Chicago
Climate Exchange (CCX). Further, the survey of carbon offsets was limited to US based
mitigation work and did not include international development projects.
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This section discussed some of the challenges we face in addressing climate
change in effective ways. An overview of the greenhouse gas trading market provides a
sense of the scale to the US based market. The political economy of wealth and power
outlined some of the powerful interests with stake in maintaining business as usual. The
following section outlines the methods used to gather primary and secondary data for this
project.
Methods
The methods used in this thesis were selected to best address the research
question: what are the social impacts of carbon offset projects within Central American
communities? Additional social impacts on the industrialized world were explored after
research was conducted. Two separate approaches were used to obtain specific
information relevant to each type of offset proj ect. Volunteer work was used to gain entry
into improved wood stove development projects. Interviews were conducted during the
course of volunteer work with employees, the organization's board of directors, and
project participants. Moreover, I visited 10 households involved in stove projects and
conducted interviews with local residents concerning their experience with carbon
offsets. I also visited several tree nurseries that were financed by carbon credits. These
nurseries were used by logging organizations to reduce environmental pressure on native
hardwood tree species through reforestation.
I employed an alternate approach to obtain information on afforestation and
forestry conservation projects that use carbon offsetting. Online research was first
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conducted on eligible organizations. NGOs best suited to the research question were
identified and contacted. A series of inquiries were made via email to determine each
organization's level of willingness to work with outside researchers. After positive
correspondence and disclosure about my research objectives, I asked to visit several
afforestation and forest conservation sites sponsored by carbon credits then arranged to
visit forestry sites. I was introduced to key organization employees and forestry workers
and lived for one week at two work sites. During this time, I interviewed forestry
workers, supervisors, and project directors. The local communities surrounding
afforestation sites were surveyed to better understand the ways in which local
communities have been impacted by carbon financed development work.
The paper now addresses several theoretical issues related to carbon offsetting.
From an historical context, issues of political economy, access to resources, and the
privatization of communal lands are considered. This section provides a theoretical
framework for subsequent analysis of the emerging paradigm of cap and trade.
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CHAPTER II
THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF CARBON OFFSETS
As previously discussed, North vis-a.-vis South power relations play prominently
into the underlying framework for the functionality of the voluntary carbon market, the
South serving as a 'cost effective' local for the outsourcing of environmental services in
the form ofgreenhouse gas reduction or sequestration. These power dynamics play out in
a manner of ways. First person interviews with several local NGO directors revealed that
these individuals are at a distinct power disadvantage.
Asymmetrical power relationships are important to carbon-financed development.
Power comes in the form of disparities in wealth. NGO directors are often under pressure
to obtain funding sources to carry out project goals. These external monetary constraints
may motivate developers to accept highly unfavorable contractual agreements with offset
companies. Offset agreements are often complex and multifaceted. These legal briefs
sometimes require the reader to have a basic working knowledge of legal jargon in
conjunction with a college level education. NGOs may be at a distinct disadvantage in
fully comprehending these legally binding contracts.
The contracts are largely written by northern offset companies. Interestingly,
project responsibility is placed in the hands of development workers in economically
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poor regions. The shift in project responsibility from project developer to NGO is
important if projects do not progress as originally intended9•
This case study examines improved wood stoves. The organization producing the
stoves was under full contractual agreement for maintaining greenhouse gas reductions
over the entire five-year lifetime of the project. Corporate donors that fund carbon offsets
maintain a measure of control over a project. NGOs are then subjected to complex real
world situations, which mayor may not conform to intended project outcomes.
Regardless of these real world results, Northern businesses' offset responsibility' onto
the NGOs they work with lO• In essence, when corporations create contracts of this
nature, they are attempting to externalize ethics and legal responsibility onto the NGO.
Both entities are separated by geography as well as distributions of wealth. The political
ecology of emissions trading plays prominently into the overarching framework ofthis
project and in understanding which actors benefit from the model and which do not.
Within the context of this paper the term 'political economy' is used to describe a
system of power relations based on Immanuel Wallerstein's World System Theory
(1974). The use of the term political economy is also a reference to Andre Gunder
9 As seen in subsequent chapters, local NGOs are reluctant to inform business sponsors due to the potential
for legal backlash. Also, as was apparent during research, organizations and their sponsors maintained a
'don't ask, don't tell' policy that worked well for both parties.
10 This invented term is defined as a displacement of the 'burden of proof' from the carbon offset initiator
(corporation or emission trading organization) to the development organization. This effectively creates a
legal barrier between project administrators and developers. Given that project results rest in the hands of
those working on the ground, there was found to be pressure and self censorship when the project did not
go according to plan.
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Frank's notion of Dependency Theory (Biersack and Greenberg, 2006). Although the
current usage of 'political ecology' has largely moved beyond the classical Marxist and
neo-Marxist frameworks, the thesis continues to use the term in the more traditional
sense. Political ecology is used in this manner because the paper is concerned with
changes to land and resource access for locals impacted by development for climate
change. In the text, Third World Political Ecology, authors Bryant and Bailey assert that:
Political ecology is still essential to an appreciation of the environmental crisis
besetting the third world. To begin with, upheavals need to be set against a long
period of development that is rooted in distant colonial times, yet which even
today powerfully conditions the way in which human-environmental interaction
takes place in the third world (Bryant and Bailey, 1997;7).
In other words, the environmental policies of today must be situated within an
historical context to be comprehensible. The objective is not to use the term in a reductive
fashion, but rather to recognize that at the heart of many Latin American struggles lies
access to land and the productive capacities of the earth (Eckstein, Garreton-Merino,
2001).
Theoretical Approach
In his seminal text: The Invention ofDevelopment, professor and post-
development theorist Arturo Escobar describes a development model largely begun after
WWII, in which western industrialized nations moved toward "solving" issues of poverty
and lack of resources in the Global South. Nation-states throughout the developing world
became increasingly viewed through the lens of per capita income as a metric for the
evaluation of poverty. Escobar explains how-through the mechanism ofGDP-
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approximately 70% of the global population became "poor" on the day the World Bank
decided to define "poverty" as those people who make less than US $100 dollars per year
(Escobar, 1999).
Escobar attacks the World Bank's approach as overly reductive and dehumanizing
to those outside the industrialized world. The World Bank's move to 'measure poverty' is
paternalistic if a culturally situated institution from one region of the world designs a
universal measurement tool as a "standard" for the evaluation of global "poverty."
Escobar goes on to point out that with the introduction of this global meta-narrative, the
rational justification for development work became apparent: the world's poor must be
assisted in raising their standard ofliving (1999).
The paradigm of development had begun and the poor-as well as their land and
resources-became reliant on the assistance of those outside their communities. The
resources of the developing world were largely placed in the "capable hands" of rich
nations in the Global North. The use of resources and labor from the Global South was
justified as a necessary precondition of poverty alleviation by the Global Northern. The
West must "teach" those in developing nations how to live "properly." The Global South
underutilized natural resources and human labor energy that fostered a state of economic
impoverishment.
Local agency in the third world was reconceptualized under what could be seen as
a paternalistic framework of developmentalist discourse. Implicit and explicit to the
language of development ideology during the 1950s-with continuing hints today-was
the idea that the tide of economic advancement would 'raise all ships.' Trickle down
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economic theory had begun to take hold not solely as a capitalist model of progress but as
a tool through which to leverage the entire world out of "poverty."
The paradigm of developmentalism-within the context of emissions trading-
legitimizes new forms of western influence and control. Top down carbon reducing
projects may use a discourse of environmental protectionism as a continuation of western
paternalism. This thesis argues that inherent to much cap and trade rhetoric is the notion
that development work specifically in the Global South, is a primary solution to
dangerous climate change. This notion of encouraging top down development work is
problematic for several reasons because outsourcing environmental services may foster a
false sense of security without actually addressing basic resource use issues. Paternalistic
development patterns may allow the continuation of climate degradation by supporting
projects that do not actually reduce emissions as seen in the first case study documenting
wood stoves.
This relates to the thesis in that the development paradigm of overseas carbon
trading only serves to reinforce systems that initially created the climate crisis. Business
models that commodify nature as a "resource" to be exploited, and measure "success" as
exponential growth, are incapable of constructing a sustainable system. The theoretically
efficient model of emissions trading supported by many gas and coal interests is
fundamentally incapable of addressing the foundational causes of climate change policy.
The economic system that cap and trade is based on should not be trusted to create
environmental solutions. The capitalist market was not built as a long term sustainable
model. Evidence of the present market's environmental and social failures are numerous.
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Agroforestry practices have negative impacts on biodiversity (Shiva, 1987), while
industrial farming degrades topsoil (Kimbrell, 2002) and water quality (Lanyon, 1994).
Further, disproportionate burden of the negative impacts of pollution are often borne by
non-white populations throughout the world (Bullard, 1993). The following section will
discuss several ideological approaches to development.
Discourses on Development
The polarization of the debate over "good" and "bad" forms of development has
served only to complicate real world actions towards creating sensitive and sensible
policies with a human face. In the text, Beyond the Impasse, David Booth describes a
dichotomization of schools of scholars who become trapped in professing the virtues of
the market or instead take a Marxist or neo-Marxist approach. Some liberal arguments
attack Marxists as economically obsessed, overly reductive theorists with no alternative
solutions for development, while some Marxists assert that capitalism on a global scale
serves only to deplete resources and oppress the workers of the world (Schurrman, 2004).
Within the context of carbon emissions trading via forestry, some critics claim
that the carbon-offset market is a continuation of conventional development discourse
(Lohmann, 2006). Within this development paradigm, forests and natural resources are
"managed" by northern players intent on extracting "environmental services" from the
Global South. The ability to protect and manage the 'atmospheric commons' is framed as
the responsibility of western nations (Lohmann, 2006). This developmentalist framework
is supported by the UNFCCC' Kyoto Protocol and copied by the US based voluntary
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carbon trading market. The guidelines of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), state that "developed nations" (Annex I & II) who signed
and ratified the Kyoto Protocol are legally limited in their ability to pollute the
atmosphere with greenhouse gases during the Protocol's commitment period (2008-
2012). However, "developing nations" (Non-Annex countries) are not legally bound to
emissions caps (UNFCCC, 2009).
The system allows industrialized nations to conveniently obtain carbon
commodities without changing resource use practices. Further, the UN creates
justifications for allowing developing nations to go unregulated include: receiving
financing from Annex I and II countries for green energy development, and allowing
developed nations to meet emissions targets through carbon offsetting. In Article 6,
section 1 the Kyoto Protocol states:
For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party included
in Annex I may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party's emission
reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions
by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in
any sector of the economy (UNFCCC, 2009)11.
The ability for industrialized nations to meet emission reduction goals by
purchasing 'extra' carbon permits from poorer nations is undoubtedly more 'convenient'
and cost effective than meeting emission reductions in the Global North. The west is
again relying on the underdeveloped world to meet the demands of a western market
11 For a full review of the protocol including the quoted section, go to:
http://unfccc.int/essentiaLbackground/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php.
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commodity other than raw materials and labor. As previously stated, non-Annex nations
most notably: Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) do not have regulated emission
limits under the Kyoto framework. This allows developed nations to commodify the
ecological and industrial processes of third world nations. In his book, Open Veins of
Latin America, the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano described the ongoing paradigm
of exploitation:
Our (Latin American) region still works as a menial. It continues to exist at the
service of others' needs, as a source and reserve of oil and iron, of copper and
meat, of fruit and coffee, the raw materials and foods destined for rich countries
which profit more from consuming them than Latin America does from producing
them (1973;1).
In essence, the Kyoto Protocol and the voluntary carbon trading market are
extensions of colonial processes of labor and resource exploitation. Fundamental changes
would need to occur in resource use patters if cheap under-regulated sources of goods,
including carbon offsets, were no longer available. China has become a prominent
scapegoat in efforts to shift responsibility away from western industrialized nations.
Recent emission calculations show that China has recently surpassed the United
States as the world's leading polluter of greenhouse gases (Harrabin, 2008). However, the
statistic does not account for per capita emissions, an inherently important factor when
assigning responsibility or blame for the drivers of climate change. On a per capita basis,
an average US citizen emits about six times more greenhouse gases than a Chinese
citizen (Butler, 2007).
Regulated and voluntary climate change mitigation policies are explained from a
reductive technological context. The framing of cap and trade as a technical fix overlooks
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the social and economic context that gives meaning. In essence, efforts to address climate
change via emissions trading are insufficient because historical and political factors are
overlooked (Cohen, Demerritt, Robinson, & Rothman, 1998). The tacit assertion is that
industrialized nations have the foresight to protect and sustainably manage natural
resources. This claim that capitalism contains the seeds of redemption has not been
supported by time with present models of production known to deplete and overuse
environmental resources (Foster, 1997). However, long term "sustainable development"
models are placed within a global commodities market proven unsustainable.
Both development projects reviewed purport to reduce greenhouse gases by
privatizing the atmosphere under a market-based paradigm. The atmosphere becomes an
environmental 'bank' capable of issuing credits (pollution permits) and withdrawals (the
right to pollute). The 'banking system' ofcarbon offsetting essentially colonizes the
atmospheric frontier. The earth's environment becomes framed as a monetized entity
within a market friendly model. As was the case during the colonial era, the voices of
local and indigenous inhabitants are systematically marginalized in this new development
discourse.
Voluntary carbon offsetting, as both market-driven industry and 'environmental'
movement to reduce climate change, is influencing Central American communities in
diverse ways. Yet, there is tremendous variability in carbon trading projects. The projects
implemented by two small NOGs surveyed differed epistemologically and
methodologically from carbon forestry programs financed by the World Bank's "Carbon
Finance Unit" and the "BioCarbon Fund." Some of these differences in management and
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ideology came in the form of tree species planted, while others were reflected in the scale
of community involvement. Questions concerning the role of each development
organization must be asked. What functions do development organizations play in the
North vis-a.-vis South context of power relations? More specifically, in what ways are
narratives employed to frame development discourse? Are these narratives historically
situated into specific country contexts?
In Nicaragua, despite sweeping land reforms made by the Sandinista
government's rise to power in 1979, land continues to remain in relatively few private
hands. Carlos Fonseca, one of the three founders of the FSLN (Sandinista party) stated,
"in Nicaragua, no peasant will be without land, nor land without people to work it"
(Burns and Charlip, 2002;277). The Sandinista government's policies to redistribute land
were effective in giving many rural peasants access to land tenure. The land given to over
83,000 poor families was however only expatriated "from the Somozas or their closest
allies," allowing other rich elite landowners to retain their huge land holding (Burns and
Charlip, 2002;277).
From an historical perspective, the next section of the paper describes how certain
similarities exist between carbon offset sponsored monoculture tree plantations and the
privatization of common lands throughout history. The discussion is also designed to
provide a theoretical basis to situate the reader into a discourse over private property
rights vs. open access lands. The discussion below is specifically valid to the research on
forest-based offsets because the majority ofthe Nicaraguan people continue to struggle
with issues of land tenure and access to resources.
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CHAPTER III
PRIVATIZING THE COMMONS
This chapter frames the notion of 'privatizing the commons' in two different
ways. First, emissions offsets often encourage the privatization of land by funding
forestry projects that deny access to local communally available lands. Alternately,
privatization of the commons also refers to the 'atmospheric commons' the political
economy of pollution rights vis-a.-vis climate policy. This alternate interpretation will be
discussed in the subsequent section ofthis chapter titled "Atmospheric Privatization."
The consolidation of land ownership in Nicaragua was taking place before the
invention of carbon offset sponsored development. However, emissions funding may
encourage privatization and have detrimental impacts on local livelihoods. Proponents of
large-scale afforestation work often assert that employment opportunities are created
because of sustainable development projects (World Bank, 2009). Conversely, natural
resources collected from adjacent forestland are available to locals, yet often goes
unquantified. Individuals and communities in the Global South may utilize forestry
resources including food, medicine, and fuel. However, these resources are often ignored
within a developmentalist framework until they cease to be available and must be
purchased.
Large-scale afforestation projects, including those funded by the World Bank,
assert that providing employment opportunities increases standard of living by increased
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access to resources. What should also be considered within the context of these projects
is the change in access to natural resources that communities may experience. Access
issues should be considered in the context of determining the legitimacy of carbon
financed afforestation projects. From an historical perspective, the chapter will begin by
describing a way in which to frame the privatization of land.
The seminal work Das Capital (Vol. I) by Karl Marx examines the ways in which
land and resources expropriate energy and capital from laborers. Capitalist driven
systems of 'primitive accumulation' are examined through an historical context. Legal
frameworks including the laws termed "Bills for Inclosure of Commons" (sic) were used
to expropriate land from the poor in Great Britain (1990;885). Marx used numerous
examples to disaggregate the underlying processes ofthe system and trace elite's efforts
to privatize resources in myriad contexts.
The justification for the privatization of the common resources often arrives with
logical reasons for unequal distribution of land across social and geographical spaces.
The expropriation of land has been legitimized by excessive taxation to "bankrupt the
tenant" and force debt bondage (Du Boise, 2007;101). Privatization has also been
presented as a means of protecting and preserving the commons. Garrett Hardin in his
influential essay The Tragedy ofthe Commons, asserted "freedom in a commons brings
ruin to all" (1968;1244). Hardin argued for either complete state control ofland or the
preeminence of private property rights to preserve natural resources.
For many the reification of private property remains a foundational institution and
within the US Constitution and remains sacrosanct and indisputable (Ely, 2007).
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Privatization moves to its natural conclusion when carbon offsets essentially represent
'atmospheric real estate.' Private ownership has traditionally contributed to western
capitalist notions of land rights. However, these ideas sublimate the underlying
conditions that relegate countless laborers to a state of perpetual poverty and state
authority (West, 2001 ;22). What conditions exists beneath the social and economic
conditions that foster privatization of land under the various guises of improvement,
progress, and now environmental services? Marx described these conditions as
'exploitation oflabor' and the privatization of the commons. The ultimate underlying
project behind privatization is to centralize and stratify power to allow owners to become
'masters in a world of slaves.'
When the Irish Potato Famine began in 1845, the peasants experienced both
natural and humanly constructed hardships. Although it is generally agreed that a fungus:
Phylophthora Infestans, was responsible for a potato blight that devastated the Irish
peasantry's staple food crop, the underlying reasons for the famine and resulting hardship
of an entire class may also be found in economic conditions of the land tenure system
(West, 2001). The Irish peasantry lacked land tenure. Thomas Malthus, although largely
focused on population issues, proposed within the context of the Irish Potato famine that:
There is a fatal deficiency in one of the greatest sources of prosperity, the perfect
security of property; and till this defect is remedied, it is not so easy to pronounce
upon the degree in which the redundant capital of England would flow into
Ireland with the best effect (Malthus, 1951).
In other words, Malthus asserts that a redistribution of land to the peasant class of
Ireland would mitigate the potato famine and promote economic prosperity. Under this
view, laborers and agriculturalists that lack land tenure are seen to bare the worst impacts
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of environmental and social degradation. Unfortunately, disenfranchisement of the poor
from property has a well-established historical basis in Great Britain.
Marx described the centralization of property in the hands of a few through his
discourse on enclosures in chapter 26, The Secret ofPrimitive Accumulation, of Capital,
Vol. 1. The process of stripping land away from the poor is seen as a transformation of
arable peasant land and habitations to "townes pulled down for sheepe-walks" (sic)
(1990;879), in other words, the forced depopulation of the small land holdings of the
countryside. This change forced the population to move en mass from rural to urban areas
and effectively denied peasants access to the land and resources making them destitute
and easily manipulated.
Over the centuries, the lives of the working class were further crafted by
legislation that created a direct dependency on those who owned land and resources. By
1750 the "rights of modern private property had been established. In addition, capitalists
began to employ the new laws as "instrument(s) by which the people's land is stolen"
(Marx, 1990;883-4). The primary instruments and methodology for modern capital
accumulation established capitalism as the principle economic and theoretical model of
growth. Carbon offsetting is simply a continuation of capitalism's need to privatize the
commons.
Without land, a population is easy to control, thus "capital by its very logic
imposes what is in effect a scorched earth strategy" that relegates the worker to a position
of forced labor (Foster, 2007). As a result, economic and social conditions in England
began to change through sweeping top-down legislation. The overall effect created a
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situation in which the poor were unable to fend for themselves and were reliant on
assistance from those who created their condition in the first place. Specific reasons
drove the expansion of capitalism's ancient scorched earth policy.
Large increases in pastureland in conjunction with a growing disenfranchised
labor-base allowed great increases in productivity in industrial sectors. Marx traces
privatization in Britain to the enclosure acts instituted at the close of the 15th Century
(1990;880). According to Marx, the acts were specifically designed by early capitalists to
shape labor patterns by denying the poor access to land tenure through excessive taxation
or outright violence. The outcome of the enclosure acts and the dismantling of common
spaces:
Convert(ed) the land into a merely commercial commodity, extending the area of
large scale agricultural production, and increasing the supply of rightless
proletarians driven from their land (Marx, 1990;885).
Marx goes on to describe how this "industrial reserve army" of landless
disenfranchised workers provided the necessary labor base for the industrial revolution
(1990;781). Additionally, despite much contention, the capitalist ideology continues to
emphasis centralization of land and the strict regulation of property rights in the interest
of production and capital accumulation. This discussion of the privatization of land is
important to the thesis in several respects. Privatization of 15th Century peasant land has
continued and now encompasses privatization of the atmosphere's ability to regulate
temperature through cap and trade models. Many elites in both contexts may claim that
privatization leads to protection of resources. However, this claim can be rejected as false
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when we examine the ways in which privatization has degraded environments and human
food security for the last 400 years.
The connection between privatization of land and cap and trade is that both
models are legislated from the top down by elites. Cap and trade is the natural outgrowth
of privatization of land. Proponents may argue that the system is functional because from
their perspective it is a profitable model. Just as wealthy landowners of the 15th Century
would approve of consolidating the land in the hands of a few. In other words, both elite
groups systematically overlook the damages to food security and long term sustainability.
The Tragedy of the Commons
When the article Tragedy ofthe Commons was written in 1968, Garrett Hardin
asserted that there was a need to privatize or centralize land ownership to avoid global
overexploitation of resources. The seminal essay explores land use patterns by
problematizing the negative environmental impacts of allowing an "open" space for use
by independent cattle herders.
The essay prioritizes a particular paradigm through promoting the need to protect
private property through centralized private or state ownership of land to serve 'the
greater good.' Hardin bases his opposition to communal property rights by creating a
scenario in which pastoralists that, through overgrazing their livestock, inevitably destroy
collective property due to shortsighted self-interest (1968). This argument is theoretically
predicated on "rational" choice and purposes that "freedom in a commons brings ruin to
all" (1968;1244). The essay promotes an idea ofresource use that directly contradicts
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Adam Smith's notion of the invisible hand (Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard,
Policansky, 1999).
In Adam Smith's foundational work, The Wealth ofNations, the "invisible hand"
is conceptualized as the individual work of an entrepreneur, who, while working for
private gain, actually furthers the common good, or "the public interest" (1937;423).
Individuals, according to Smith, may labor in an industrious fashion with self interest and
personal wealth accumulation in mind, yet through the phenomenon of the invisible hand,
their selfishness will promote prosperity and bounty for all (Smith, 1937).
Hardin's work contradicted Smith's by claiming that self-interest, within a
rational framework, would result in deterioration and degradation of the environment
through overuse. Hardin's conclusion, among other social theorists and economists,
provided the justification for policy makers, through governmental bodies, to expropriate
land and resources under the premise of protecting land for the 'greater good' (Ostrom,
et. a1.1999;278).
Of central importance is that Hardin defines "the commons" as "open access"
land. Under this specific reductive framing, the conditions that constitute the commons
do create a scenario in which, "there are no property rights or rules at all and it is widely
accepted that under such circumstances 'The Tragedy of the Commons' will indeed
arise" (Moberg, 2004). Hardin narrowly defines the term "commons" in a manner that
does not exist in the majority of non-western societal conditions--one in which there is
no management. In other words, resource use practices that deviate from western
capitalism are oversimplified to the point of absurdity. Again, an argument for
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privatization and capitalist ideology holds up alternative examples outside of their
historical and social context to devalue other ways of living. However, there are
numerous holes in the logic of capitalism.
The essay, Revisiting the Commons, coauthored by Ostrom, Burger, Field,
Norgaard, & Policansky (1999) re-examined Hardin's work and found that human
oversight of collective land holding is predominantly the rule, rather than the exception.
In essence, communities generally self regulate the "rational" individualistic logic that
Hardin asserts is built into human resource use patterns. This regulation occurs at the sub-
national level outside of the state or private sphere (1999). In other words, privatization
does not inherently lead to environmental protection. The authors use a Cambridge-based
research study published by David Sneath in 1998 to propose alternates to Hardin's
assertions12. Sneath's research showed satellite images of the border region between
Russia and Mongolia. The land surveyed was controlled by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) until 1991. After the fall of the Soviet Union, political authority was
transferred to the Russian state (Sneath, 1998). Satellite images of the border region
between Russia and Mongolia showed different land use patterns. Researchers concluded
that within the case study, more destructive land use practices occurred on Russian
territory despite, or because of, strong state land holdings.
A more comprehensive analysis of data on human environmental interactions may
support or refute the assertion that state controlled land leads to greater environmental
degradation. However, it is important to note that Hardin's thesis showing a causal
12 The full reference from Norgaard, & Policansky 's 1999 article is: D. Sneath, Science 281, 1147 (1998).
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relationship between lack of land ownership and environmental degradation may not be
accurate. Traditional Mongolian nomadic pastoralists outlined in Sneath's study refute
Hardin's argument by maintaining "traditional group-property institutions," allowing
seasonal movement and a self-regulating body of individuals who preserve their territory
without significant degradation (Ostrom et. al., 1999). The debate between communal
lands vis-a.-vis privatization was a central theme in Karl Marx' explanation of political
economy.
In The German Ideology, Marx describes a situation in which capital and land are
centralized and accumulated in the hands of a rich, elite class who commands a landless
peasantry to work for subsistence (Tucker, 1978). Marx speaks of primary or original
accumulation and the ways in which:
The Bourgeois capitalists favoured the operation, with the intention, among other
things, of converting the land into a merely commercial commodity, extending the
area of large-scale agricultural production, and increasing the supply of free and
rightless proletarians driven from the land (Marx, 1990;885).
Marx describes how the material conditions in which humans interact to form the
foundation of production. We are led through a chronological process that traces human
environmental interaction through various stages of being, beginning as a "natural" tribal
state, the familial relationship writ large. Then, as population and wants increase, the
complexity of social structures also increase, and lead to expanded exploitation of the
lower human echelons within an unnatural social hierarchy of 'communal and State
ownership.' Marx's works describing estranged labor, sees the worker's separation from
their means of production as inversely related to the accumulation of wealth in the hands
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of a few. As capital increases, the worker's life energy is depleted and "the worker
becomes poorer the more wealth he produces" (Tucker, 1978;71).
Private property and the privatization of communally shared spaces have specific
impacts on the worker. Marx asserts "private property is thus the product, the result, the
necessary consequence of alienated labor, of the external relation of the worker to nature
and to himself" (Tucker, 1978;79). In other words, private property and wage labor are
directly related to one another as commodities, and as things, they may be more easily
controlled. Conversely, under a socialist or communitarian system people may be more
capable of meeting their basic needs with far less time and energy spent laboring because
time and energy can be directly applied to subsistence activities. Elaborate development
projects are often created by Northern interests to control and incorporate populations
outside the world system of capitalist production (Escobar, 1995).
This discussion of private property and wage labor relates to the thesis in
numerous ways. The purported strength of the cap and trade model is "efficiently" and
"cost effectively" meeting environmental goals while allowing economic growth to
continue. Yet, the notions of 'cost effectiveness' and 'efficiency' are only legitimate in a
western capitalist framework. The notion of "cost effectiveness" may be unpackaged to
reveal the underlying drivers of 'cheap labor' and 'lax environmental laws. ' In essence,
emissions trading schemes acknowledge asymmetrical north-south power relations and
makes use of southern underdevelopment for northern profit. Cap and trade relies on the
anti-politics machine of development discourse to conveniently overlook historical
relationships between nations and peoples.
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Much impoverishment in Latin America has been due to colonial and neocolonial
era' in which labor and raw materials were systematically expropriated from the
indigenous inhabitants (Galeano, 1973). Cap and trade is framed in economic terms and
relies on ahistorical narratives that continue a neocolonial legacy of exploitation. Yet, if
market based approaches are not taken as "givens" other alternatives may be available.
Industrialized nations and the overseas markets maintained by western consumption
patterns continue to be responsible for the majority of dangerous climate change. The
tragedy of the commons has not been a market failure but rather a market success.
Western capitalism has indeed been so successful in privatizing and commodifying
resources and land that there are fewer markets left. In essence, this new climate crisis
has simply been employed to justify the further expansion of a commodities market for
questionable quality carbon offsets.
The Accumulation of Land
Albert Einstein's article titled Why Socialism? appeared in the Monthly Review
magazine's first installment in 1949. The work examined the historical basis for land
accumulation. Einstein described that:
Most of the major states of history owed their existence to conquest. The
conquering peoples established themselves, legally and economically, as the
privileged class of the conquered country. They seized for themselves a monopoly
of the land ownership and appointed a priesthood from among their own ranks.
The priests, in control of education, made the class division of society into a
permanent institution and created a system of values by which the people were
thenceforth, to a large extent unconsciously, guided in their social behavior
(Einstein, 1949).
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In other words, Einstein asserts that the social construction of reality within a
capitalist framework is meant to legitimize popular acceptance of privatization rights in
the hands of the few. Einstein's discussion of the way in which power is legitimized
under a system of predatory capitalism is similar in many respects to critiques of
development and development discourse. For Arturo Escobar the present world system
continues to rely on antiquated notions of "growth" and "progress." Modernization theory
and trickledown-economics form the rhetorical if not the ideological underpinnings of the
development paradigm even though the legitimacy of both theories has been largely
called into question (Escobar, 1995).
The privatization of public spaces in Great Britain in the 16th Century illustrated
the ways in which common land has been expropriated and enveloped in a market based
system with negative social and environmental impacts (Tucker, 1978). Similarly, forest
based cap and trade policies do not to address the underlying causes of social inequity,
that of unequal distribution of land and resources but instead may encourage wealth
disparities. Garrett Hardin's criticism ofthe commons must be critiqued as a
fundamentally flawed argument based on reductive reasoning that does not take into
consideration alternate systems of subsistence. The material conditions that give rise to
social inequity and asymmetrical land and resource distribution must be engaged to fully
address the environmental issues that we face on a global scale.
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Privatization of the Atmosphere
This section heading refers to the ways in which global warming development
narratives are framed and addresses issue of scale. Both the UNFCCC compliance and
US voluntary markets frame responsibility for atmospheric pollution as a universal
problem with a universal imperative for all countries to participate. To this effect, the
United Nations directs all governments of the world to participate in climate change
mitigation with "common but differentiated responsibilities13." The compliance and US
markets support privatization of the atmosphere. The will to quantify then control
resources, both tangible and intangible, has an historical basis. Larry Lohmann of the
research and advocacy group The Corner House states that:
History has seen attempts to commodify land, food, labor, forests, water, genes
and ideas. Carbon trading follows in the footsteps of this history and turns the
earth's carbon-cycling capacity into property to be bought or sold in a global
market. Through this process of creating a new commodity - carbon - the Earth's
ability and capacity to support a climate conducive to life and human societies is
now passing into the same corporate hands that are destroying the climate
(Lohmann, 2006,356).
The two projects described in this work illustrate how carbon finance has
effectively commodified the carbon mitigation services of NGOs in the developing
world. Privatization of carbon may seem like a cost effective means of quantifying
greenhouse gas emissions. However, real flaws were revealed in both case studies
showing this system of free market environmentalism has real world impacts on
marginalized groups that exacerbate inequities. Development projects purporting to
13 Quoted text taken from http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/items/2830.php on November 4,2009.
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function as solutions to climate change must be both scientifically verifiable and work
towards redistributing wealth internationally.
Study Limitations
The study's primary focus is on two types of carbon-based offsets, one involving
wood burning cooking stoves, and the other concerning afforestation projects. Due to
time and resource constraints, the thesis will primarily focus on only certain aspects of
the debate surrounding carbon offsets. A brief history of climate change policies is
covered, as well as regional factors influencing both projects. However, the bulk of the
research examines the ethical implications of the voluntary carbon trading market and the
political economy of offsets. Through first-hand observation, the paper seeks to reveal the
social and physical impacts of carbon offsetting on people. In addition, several
projections for social and environmental impacts are made based on a potential teleology
of present events. Potential future outcomes are largely concerned with community
access to resources and the efficacy of improved stove projects.
Improved wood stoves increase indoor air quality and improve the health of cooks
(Baldwin, 1987). Improper ventilation and incineration of biomass has been shown to
affect human health and lead to a variety of ailments including: acute respiratory
infections (ARl), chronic obstructive lung disease (COLD), and low birth rates (Smith,
1994;23). Health issues associated with appropriate technology stoves are not addressed
in detail within the body of this work because they fall outside the scope of this research
project.
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Beyond human health impacts, improved stoves are also seen as a means to
reduce greenhouse gases through more efficient combustion. Individual stoves have been
found to save approximately one ton of carbon dioxide gas (C02) per year, equal to one
carbon credit as compared to the traditional unimproved stove known as the "three stone
fire" (Still, MacCarty, 2008). To place greenhouse gas emissions in perspective, a simple
comparison is needed. One ton of C02 has a volume equal to 556.2m3 • The incineration
of one gallon of conventional (regular) gasoline creates 4.867m3 of C02. Therefore, one
ton of C02 is equal to the combustion of approximately 114 gallons of conventional
gasoline. (International Carbon Bank and Exchange, 2000). This rudimentary association
shows that irrespective of international development, resource use patterns in the
industrialized world are crucial to reducing emissions worldwide.
Carbon offsets improved the health and financial condition of participants based
on interviews with improved stove owners and manufacturers. Small scale forestry
projects generated a variety of benefits including employment for locals, potential future
tourist infrastructure, and improved environmental condition. Fundamental challenges
exist within the voluntary market that will be addressed in detail throughout the paper in
the context of each development project.
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CHAPTER IV
TREE FARMS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The world's forests cover an estimated 30% of the earth's surface. During the
1990s, deforestation accounted for approximately 20% of global greenhouse gas
emissions (UNFCCC, 2008). Many proponents within the voluntary carbon market
promote tree planting as a means of addressing climate change through carbon dioxide
sequestration (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006). The following narrative examines several
development projects that utilize carbon funding through afforestation. Information was
obtained through literature and web-based sources. Several of the projects described were
visited first hand in an effort to better understand how individuals and communities were
being impacted.
The term "afforestation," within the context of carbon capture and storage has a
specific meaning based on the Kyoto Protocol. Articles 3(3) and 3(4) of the Protocol
allow only 'reforestation' and 'afforestation' as Clean Development Mechanisms.
According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
"afforestation" is defined in 16ICMP.1, Annex, paragraph 1 as "the direct human-induced
conversion of land that has not been forested for a period of at least 50 years to forested
land through planting, seeding and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed
sources" (CDM Rulebook, 2009;1). In other words, afforestation is the planting of trees
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on land that has not been a forest for over 50 years. However, as the subsequent section
will illustrate, there are fundamental differences between afforestation projects.
Monoculture Tree Farms
Not all afforestation projects are created equal. Global warming mitigation
strategies designed around large-scale monoculture afforestation projects are seen by
proponents as an efficient means of delivering environmental services. Some
afforestation projects supported by the World Bank's Carbon Finance Unit (CFU)
promote the notion that carbon offsetting via tree farms may run parallel to the social
goals of alleviating poverty and contributing to sustainable development in the Global
However, many afforestation projects supported by large donors including the
World Bank have been found to reduce local inhabitant's access to land (Cotula, Dyer, &
Vermeulen, 2008). Some critics have also argued that local access to forest resources
diminishes because of particular development practices associated with sweeping forestry
projects managed by large corporations. Planting eucalyptus and other fast growing non-
natives species fundamentally reduces water resources for local communities and
degrades ecosystem diversity (Engel, V., Esteban Jobbagy, G., Stieglitz, M., Williams,
M., & Jackson, R. 2005). These are hidden costs inherent to some large-scale carbon
financed development, which go largely overlooked and uncalculated. Proponents claim
14 The World Bank's Project Goals were accessed from the following website on October 27,2009;
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITEIEXTERNALITOPICS/ENVIRONMENTIEXTCARBONFINANCE/O"
contentMDK:21841841~menuPK:4125909~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:4125853,00.ht
ml
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that large-scale forestry projects are efficient and cost-effective (World Bank, 2009). The
large-scale commodification of forestry resources requires infrastructure and services.
These features are "external costs" and include the construction of roads, ports, and
shipping industries. Guards must be trained to protect private property and a market for
wood products must be maintained. These outside aspects often go unquantified yet are
essential to maintain international commodity markets. These systems often prioritize
economic profit over local livelihoods and healthy ecosystems (Lohmann, 2006).
Empirical evidence supports that extensive monoculture forestry projects may
displace small family farms and marginalize local land rights, culture, and ecology
(Liverman, 2008). On the other side of the debate are actors who promote industrial
forestry practices and have strong arguments for the economies of scale that monocrops
are claimed to afford.
The World Bank' "Precious Woods Project" in Southwestern Nicaragua is one
example of carbon offsetting through monoculture afforestation. At the time of writing
the Bank was assisting a Swiss-based Corporation known as 'Precious Woods' establish
teak plantations on 600 hectares of private land on the Costa Rican border. The
corporation is not new to the forestry industry and has subsidiaries in Costa Rica, Brazil,
Gabon and The Netherlands (Precious Woods, 2009). Proponents within the World Bank
assert that:
The project will create a sustainable source of valuable wood for national and
international markets, thereby reducing the pressures on natural forests. The
project will thus bring about carbon sequestration as well as benefits to
ecological, wildlife, and landscape diversity. This will enable sustainable,
income-generation options for poor and vulnerable communities (2009).
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The bank's claim that the Precious Woods Project will foster environmental
diversity and social sustainability has been echoed in the words of some environmental
groups including several that were surveyed as part ofthis research. Some proponents of
monoculture afforestation claim that planting fast growing tree species on degraded lands
may produce wood otherwise cut from native forests and used for firewood or
construction. Monoculture forestry projects are a win-win situation according to
proponents because logging "precious woods" like teak results in the production of
furniture, flooring, and other products not intended for burning. In other words,
commercial hardwood projects may reliably generate carbon offsets because the wood is
intended for preservation and not incineration. Yet, there is great difficulty in determining
the ultimate uses of these wood products particularly after the useful life of the item is
gone. It is difficult to determine if wood that represents sequestered carbon may be
deposited in a landfill or burned at some time in the future. A wood product burned-Dr
simply decomposed-returns carbon back into the atmosphere invalidating the offset
project at an undetermined time in the future. This unknown variable challenges the
assertion that C02 will remain trapped in wood products in perpetuity.
According to award winning ecologist Vandana Shiva, monoculture tree farms
reduce biodiversity and lead to water and soil degradation. Shiva emphasizes that "the
exclusive focus on industrial wood destroys the food, fodder, and water production
capacities of the forest ... the eucalyptus (tree) has become a symbol ofthis monoculture"
(Shiva, 1997;57). Similarly, Larry Lohmann ofthe UK-based research organization, The
Corner House, argues that large-scale tree plantations in Costa Rica have devastated local
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livelihoods as well as ecosystems. Lohmann goes on to outline how development efforts
that employ monoculture plantations affect the forest by:
Compet(ing) aggressively for land that might otherwise be given over to
secondary regeneration and conservation of native forest. In addition, because
CDM forestry projects, for economic reasons, would probably have to cover 1000
hectares and upwards they could well threaten the land tenure of people carrying
out other forest projects in Costa Rica. The average landholding in the country is
less than 50 hectares, with most parcels belonging to families (2006;249).
Approximately 25% of Costa Rica's total land area is designated as 'national
park,' 'protected area,' 'forest reserve,' or other protected biological zone (CCSA, 2005).
Monocrops are not part of these protected zones and may simply put pressure on
remaining unprotected forests. Similar to Costa Rica, Nicaragua has a comparable
breakdown of parklands, with about 21.8% of total land area designated as protected
(UNEP, 2009). However, in several respects, Nicaragua is more vulnerable to both
deforestation and large-scale afforestation projects than Costa Rica due to a number of
factors. Weak government regulation, economic impoverishment, and vertically
integrated corruption challenge the preservation of native forests. Already, Nicaraguan
forests have been exposed to rampant illegal logging operations and severe
environmental degradation (Richards, M., Wells, A., Contreras-Hermosilla A., &
Pommier D. (2003). Nicaragua is beginning to follow the Costa Rican model of sweeping
tree farm style afforestation via carbon offsetting because the majority of non-protected
land is privately owned. Nicaragua may also face even greater challenges to ecological
sustainability and land tenure for the poor due to structural and economic hurdles that
landless Nicaraguans continues to face.
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The following sections provide a brief overview of primary research conducted in
Central America. The sections describe two separate case studies integrated into the
voluntary emissions trading market to provide a framework for analyzing the ways in
which international development is interfacing with climate change policies.
Case Study 1: Forest Based Carbon Capture
The subsequent account is based on primary research consolidated from
interviews with several NGOs participating in the voluntary carbon offset market. Three
tree nurseries and three afforestation sites were surveyed. Interviews with project
participants were conducted. Three NGOs were surveyed first hand. The World
Bank/Precious Woods project was investigated via literature and the Internet. Four
development projects are analyzed in this chapter. For the purposes of clarity, each
project is labeled with a different pseudonym. The first two NGOs described below used
a limited variety of tree species. These organizations will be referred to as "Group I and
Group II." The third group focused on planting native trees and employing a community
based approach to conservation will be referenced as Group III. The World Bank
sponsored forestry program is described as the "The Precious Woods Project."
Each organization surveyed applied different methodologies to achieve project
objectives. These differences were also manifest in individual epistemologies of each
organization. Group I and II planted only four types of trees for commercial wood and
fuel production. These tree species were cedro, a type oftrue cedar,pachote, (Ceiba
aesculifolia), eucalyptus, and teca (teak). Notably, both eucalyptus and teak are not
67
native to Central America. Group III planted only native trees for non-commercial use
and employed a more broad reaching community-based approach to conservation.
The fIrst organizations surveyed (Group I and II) had been working for over a
decade to prevent deforestation of primary forest through large-scale tree planting
projects. In conjunction with improved stove dissemination, tree nurseries were designed
and funded by the organization, in conjunction with local woodcutter cooperatives that
provided afforestation services. In exchange for their participation in tree planting, these
cooperatives were granted government sanctioned permits to cut between 50-250 trees
per year for their livelihood. The tree species selected for nursery cultivation were
selected for their rapid growth and desirability for cyclical harvesting.
In both tree nurseries, eucalyptus was the most prevalent tree species grown,
representing approximately 68% of total trees planted. Eucalyptus, despite the tree's
benefIts of rapid growth, is criticized as degrading natural resources for both people and
the ecosystems. The non-native tree is known to significantly reduce the size of rivers,
streams, and other water sources due to the species' veracious consumption of water, not
to mention its damaging effect on soil microorganisms and food systems (Shiva,
1997;55).
Group I decided to plant eucalyptus out of a belief that the species was a useful
tool in environmental sustainability and forest protection. Planting the fast growing tree
reduced pressure for the clearing of native forest reserves. I was informed that before the
project's inception, locals preferred burning native hard woods for cooking and heating.
However, after several years of successful eucalyptus afforestation and cutting,
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communities began to prefer eucalyptus for home cooking and heating to native wood
varieties. The claim seemed substantiated to some degree by observing firewood vendors
who sold mixed bundles of eucalyptus and native hardwoods at the same price. If pricing
is a determination of local value, then eucalyptus was indeed at least equally valued as a
fuel wood. The local people's ability to switch fuel varieties, native species to non-native
eucalyptus, was proof that the NGO was having sustainable impact and moving in the
right direction.
The assertion that planting eucalyptus takes pressure off local forests and leads to
conservation is a primary justification used by proponents of monoculture afforestation
work including the World Bank (World Bank, 2009). Some have argued that if
conservation strategies prioritize commercial woods over native tree species, biodiverse
landscapes will increasingly be replaced by commercial monoculture tree farms shown to
lack many characteristics of a healthy forest ecosystem (Hartley, 2002).
I was informed by Group I that one of the central purposes of our visit to tree
nurseries was to determine the level of support for further integrating carbon offsets into
future forestry practices. The local nursery director was supportive of expanding the role
of carbon offsets, which at the time of writing accounted for only a portion of the funding
used for trees in the nurseryl5. The types of tree species felled by forestry workers during
my visit to Group 1's project site were large and more than 15 years old. These log piles
did not appear to comprise the four tree species planted in conjunction with the NGO. In
15 Note: The salary of the nursery worker was being paid by the NGO. Further, the nursery director was
himself a forestry worker who was benefiting from the help of the NGO and eucalyptus plantations for his
livelihood.
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other words, the trees that I observed were not those planted during Group 1's project
lifetime. This might point to a 10- 15 year 'lag time' between afforestation efforts and
trees harvested. There would be great difficulty in determining the amount and quality of
native forest preserved because of the afforestation project's efforts.
Group III differed in several key respects from Groups II and 1. This unique NGO
utilized carbon offset financing to fund the planting of a diverse array of trees for
conservation showing that carbon finance may be used for a diversity array of
afforestation projects besides being used for strictly commercial purposes. This
organization's forestry activities are described in the following section.
A Different Approach to Forestry
Separate in both approach and ideology, the NGO (Group III) promoted a type of
integrated community-based afforestation that was different in several respects to the
other groups. Local forestry jobs were provided in conjunction with community
education programs for youth and adults. While the other groups planted limited tree
species for commercial wood harvesting, this organization planted 52 varieties of native
trees from seeds collected adjacent to project sites. Eight separate landowners were
contacted. These owners were convinced to sign legally binding 40-year contracts
allowing for native tree planting and protection. After the contract expires, there is hope
to renew again for a longer period. Over two hundred thousand trees were reforested on
409 hectares, an area larger than central park in New York.
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Local laborers, including women were employed. In the initial stages, 50 local
workers planted and maintained trees. Labor was divided between women who tended
the native tree nurseries, and men who planted and protected the saplings. Over the
lifetime of the first stage of the carbon financed forest project (40 years), conservative
estimates of carbon storage were estimated to amount to be approximately 170 thousand
tons of sequestered greenhouse gases. This quantity is equal to removing 30,000 cars
from the road for one year. The project's emissions savings and social impacts were
verified by the Gold Standard.
The Gold Standard (GS) certification is one of the competing standards used by
the voluntary offset market. Gold Standard projects boast 'triple bottom line' benefits,
including environmental, societal and economic development aspects that other projects
may not have (Gold Standard, 2009). The particular project under review was initiated
with assistance from the United Stated Agency for International Development (USAID)
and the US Forest Service. The Gold Standard is a Swiss-based nonprofit emissions
verifier that pledges to "contribute to sustainable development and certifies their carbon
credits for sale on both compliance and voluntary offset markets" (Gold Standard, 2009).
Since 2003, over 60 NGOs and interest groups have pledged support for
emissions trading using the Gold Standard method including: The National Trust for
Nature Conservation, The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation,
and Nuclear Safety, The Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP),
and Mercy Corps (Gold Standard, 2009). According to many organizations involved in
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carbon offsetting, the Gold Standard represents a well-respected source of project
verification and contributes to the perceived authenticity of carbon offsets.
Privatizing Profits and Socializing Losses: A Guide to Corporate Funding
The forestry NGO (Group III) described above appears to embody many
sustainable development principles providing local jobs, and planting native trees for
both environmental preservation and potential ecotourism benefits l6. Group Ill's project
activities occurred entirely on privately owned forestland. The NGO asserted that, "the
government (of Nicaragua) is not powerful enough to protect the forest and so private
organization's are more effective."
Primary factors contributing to forest degradation in the region of study include:
institutional corruption, a weak state apparatus, land monopolies and undervalued forest
goods and services (Contreras-Hermosilla, 2000). Group III employed a long term
strategy towards conservation looking into the future for ecotourism potential instead of
short-term economic benefits afforded to afforestation of lucrative woods species.
The organization's decision to value species diversity over monocrops was not
however the most "efficient" way of gaining revenue under the current carbon offset
market. According to the Business for Social Responsibility (BSR), a San Francisco-
based think tank that works with corporations to encourage sustainable business
practices, the fast growth rates of commercial tree varieties result in greater carbon
16 Ecotourism is believed to be a potential future goal that may provide a sustainable source of financing
for forest protection. Tourist dollars are attractive to many land owners. The NGO has promoted
ecotourism as a potential benefit to incentivize the signing away of land use rights.
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dioxide sequestration and create greater carbon offsets and financial rewards (BSR,
2006). The BSR claims that planting native trees is economically disadvantageous. The
organization describes various reasons for not planting native trees. These include natives
as "less efficient (at sequestering carbon dioxide) than many mono-crop projects" and
"relatively expensive" compared to monocrops, although the organization does recognize
that homogenous tree farms can "backfire in PR terms" (BSR, 2006;9). Corporate
sponsors including The Ford Foundation and Levi Strauss Foundations fund the
organization. US governmental agencies including USAID and the US Department of
State also fund the BSR17. These funding sources may have objectives that include
market expansions and increases in economic growth. The funding institutions listed
above may benefit from emissions trading schemes which function in tandem with
consumption models of production and western growth models. The BSR may overlook
uncommodified local community forest resources use patterns that lie outside market
economies which value profit over sustainability. Further, there are contrary arguments
that refute the BSR's assertions.
Nonnative tree species within monoculture tree plantations are not necessarily
more efficient at sequestering carbon dioxide than native tree species. In fact,
afforestation of nonnative species may lead to increased risk of disease, fire, and have
unknown environmental impacts (Alaska Department of Natural Resources, 2004).
17 Information on funding sources was obtained from the official BSR website at:
http://www.bsr.org/research//initiatives/funders.cfm on November 24,2009.
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The Commodification of Nature: Environmental Services for Sale
From a purely economic standpoint, controlling for the variable of negative PR,
monoculture tree farms consisting of predominantly teak and eucalyptus, would be the
logical choice for an organization interested in funding a forestry project via the
voluntary carbon market. The cost scale employed within carbon offsetting exemplifies
how free market environmental can marginalize the health of ecosystems and lead to
dynamic negative impacts for adjacent communities.
The voluntary offsetting model meshes with the contemporary "logic" of
commercial forestry practices. Market based approaches to environmental resource use
have been shown to degrade native forest ecosystems and undermined land tenure for
local inhabitants (National Research Council, 2002). For-profit forestry projects may
overlook or undervalue availability of food and fuel reserves for local communities
(Contreras-Hermosilla, 2000). The argument that greater growth leads to greater
prosperity legitimizes monoculture forestry practices under the cap and trade model, but
does little to address factors 'external' to the equation. These 'externalities' to the
voluntary market, represent species diversity and life sustaining water resources. Non-
commoditized 'social goods,' recognized by many ecologists and local communities,
often do not fundamentally represent a part of the present voluntary cap and trade system.
The environmental services provided by trees must be privatized and quantified in order
to be considered part of voluntary climate change mitigation. In one project visited, locals
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had been planting native trees for ecological reasons before the carbon offset project's
inception. A local landowner explained that he had planted over 500 native trees on his
land over the last 15 years in order to improve the environment and water quality. The
man's neighbors had also participated in similar tree planting efforts without any
payment for carbon offsets. This brings up issues of differential access to resources.
Locals who may lack capital and western education may be less likely to access carbon
finance markets. Alternately, as will be seen in the next case study, local organizations
may enter into carbon credit contracts with western developers who will benefit
disproportionately.
According to Oroup III, carbon offset financing was insufficient to support the
true maintenance costs ofthe project. In other words, only a fraction ofthe NOO's
revenues were carbon credit based and did not prove enough money to sustain the project
over its five year lifetime. Corporate carbon financing provided approximately US $6
dollars per stove unit. The organization was responsibility for maintaining the project for
a minimum of 5 years. In exchange, the business that provided the money for carbon
credits could claim greenhouse gas reductions as soon as the paperwork was signed. This
project model leaves NOOs in vulnerable positions. Two of the organizations asserted
that carbon financing provides only minimal monetary resources for the total budget of a
project. Other sources confirm that offset financing is often insufficient for total
development costs. The CEO of a UK-based environmental organization, Trees for
Cities, wrote a letter to the newspaper The Daily Telegraph in 2003 stating that:
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Future Forests (a carbon offset corporation) had offered them (Trees for Cities) 50
pence (€ 0.75) to plant a tree and maintain it for 99 years. The real cost for this
would be at least £5 per tree, meaning that Future Forests was offering us at best
10 per cent of the real cost. It would then sell-on the tree that we plant, paid for
largely through charity donations that we have raised, for around £5 to £10 to the
likes of Leonardo DiCaprio, Working Title, Avis and 02 to badge and claim as
their 'tree'. This clearly is not additional. We rejected Future Forests' offer of 50p
per tree because we have no intention of using our charitable donations to
subsidize its business (Smith, 2007;21).
The director's assertion that voluntary carbon offsetting only accounts for a
fraction of the true value of the forestry project shows a potential problem within the
market. Carbon credit prices are prone to fluctuation due to market factors. Even at the
times when offset financing is most valuable, the money is insufficient to pay for the real
project costs. These costs are shifted onto the shoulders of the project developers, often
under funded local NGOs from the Global South.
Global North-South power dynamics may confine NGOs to a vulnerable and
sometime desperate position. One option for NGOs in developing nations is simply to
agree to the carbon financer's conditions to receive an upfront "donation." The other
option available to organizations is to reject carbon financing and compete for scarce and
dwindling resources elsewhere. In essence, structural factors, most importantly the need
for revenues, may force NGOs to seek unequal and often unfair deals with firms seeking
carbon credits. Irrespective of fairness and responsibility sharing, the international carbon
trading market continues to allow carbon credit buyers to enjoy the public relations
benefits carbon offsetting can provide. These "benefits" are namely the legal ability to
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pollute or sell pollution rights combined with a powerful social and environmental
narrative. Social and ecological benefits in the developing world may be largely
unknown. Unstandardized tools for measuring forestry and stove carbon offsets may
complicate matters yet within sheltered western societies, corporations wielding
compelling stories of social and ecological success may have a profound impact on
perceived legitimacy. In other words, despite questionable scientific methods used to
quantify carbon offsets, the public in the industrialized world may be persuaded into
believing that emissions trading schemes are a legitimate means of addressing global
warming. The following section will outline conclusions regarding the three development
projects discussed in this chapter.
Case Study 1: Conclusion
This first case study documented three NGOs (groups I, III, & III) to illustrate
some of the diverse project models that function within forestry-based emissions trading
schemes. According to the corporate and US government backed Business for Social
Responsibility, native trees are less economically feasible from an efficiency standpoint
than non-native monocultures because the former is seen to sequester carbon more
rapidly than the latter. However, other researchers have concluded that native trees may
grow just as rapidly as nonnative varieties while contributing to biodiversity and ensuring
water resources remain intact. Further, forestry projects rely largely on theoretically
projected carbon sequestration over the entire life of the project. In effect, proponents
claim real world pollution occurring in the present will be mitigated by the future carbon
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sequestration ofthe biological processes of trees. Unexpected events including forest
fires, disease, illegal logging, and firewood collection may render carbon credits invalid
decades after their sale. Irrespective of uncontrollable variables, the forestry projects
surveyed were planting thousands of both native and nonnative tree species, while
employing and educating locals on conservation topics.
The underlying goal of this thesis is not to devalue the work of the NGOs. Rather,
in all cases, there are strong arguments for the environmental and social benefits of each
project. Further, those individuals interviewed were working diligently to improve
challenging conditions that were in effect far before development work began. The main
assertion within the case study is that the voluntary carbon offset model does not provide
adequate funding for NGOs to complete project objectives. More importantly, the
contract between the Southern organization and the Northern funding agency, often
places legal externalizes legal responsibility for project outcomes. In other words, the
relationship is an effort-on the part of the Northern offset organization-to privatize
profits via carbon credit sales and positive PR, while socializing losses via externalizing
project risks, environmental impacts and legal responsibilities. The paper will now turn to
a second case study focusing on an entirely different development project also utilizing
financing from the voluntary carbon offset market.
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CHAPTER V
CASE STUDY II. IMPROVED HOME COOK STOVES
Half the world's populations, or 3 billion people, use biomass for heating and
cooking (Kaygusuz, 2002; Haines, A., & Kammen, D. 2000; Haines, A, Kovats, R., S.,
Campbell-Lendrum, D., & Corvalan, C. 2006). Biomass accounts for approximately 10%
of all human energy use (Goldemberg, 2004). In the world's most economically poor
regions, approximately 80% of the population burns biomass (Biran, A, Hunt, c., 2003).
The total impact of biomass combustion on global warming is estimated at as much as 50
percent of total greenhouse gas emissions, with about one-third coming from households
(Smith,1999;4).
In the voluntary carbon trading market, improved wood stoves, if used correctly
have been shown to reduce fuel use by as much as 50% (Baldwin, 1987). Wood stove
efficiencies depend largely on the skills of the cook as well as the quality and moisture
content of the fuel available. Outside of controlled institutional settings. The stove project
under review calculated that each carbon financed stove reduced approximately one ton
of carbon dioxide per year.
Introduction
An improved wood stove project was examined to further understand the ways in
which the voluntary carbon offset industry impacts development and local communities.
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In exchange for the organization's cooperation, I worked to improve the efficiency of one
of the NGO' current stove models in an attempt to reduce the quantity of wood needed to
cook food. After three consecutive weeks of stove testing, a list of suggestions was made.
Recommendations suggested that the organization make several small changes to their
current stove design.
Through quantitatively testing procedures involving the Water Boiling Test
(WBT), stove efficiency recommendations showed that a 14% decrease in wood use
could be achieved with minor modifications. Equally important was that the modified
stove design was found to increase cooking by a mean time of 30 minutesl8 . The more
rapid cook time was important for cleaner combustion and because improved wood
stoves must not only save wood, but also cook faster to increase likelihood of local
sustainable adoption. Refer to Figure 1 in the appendix section of this work to examine
the spreadsheet comparing the relative efficiency of traditional and prototype stove
models.
History of the Organization
The NGO had been struggling to stay in business for many years. Because of the
economic recession, business was worse than usual. The organization had rented a
warehouse space in order to build improved stoves on a contractual basis. There were
18 Please see chart included in the paper's appendix for a detailed breakdown of the mean cooking times
and wood use calculations. Findings reflect the results of the Water Boiling Test (WBT) under controlled
conditions, using seasoned eucalyptus as a fuel source. All test results recorded are deemed 'significant'
based on a 5% margin of error.
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frequent breaks between orders and the organization had no office and no air
conditioning. That was before the carbon credit contract began.
A large carbon offset corporation decided to broker a deal with the NGO allowing
for the sale of carbon credits through the voluntary market. In exchange, the organization
would provide improved stoves at a subsidized price to consumers. After the contract was
signed, the initial portion of financing was allocated to the organization for present and
future project participation, material costs, and additional expenses. The money was
promptly used by the NGO to buy a permanent office space, complete with metal shop
and warehouse. A company vehicle was purchased and two additional staff members
were hired. A more comfortable office was constructed, complete with air conditioning.
The carbon credit financing provided initial capital for the organization to
purchase materials to construct a large quantity of stoves in anticipation of future sale.
The contract also provided continuous employment for the two metal fabrication workers
for a several month period. The customers were primarily small business owners who
produced tortillas or tamales from cottage industries and sold to the public from home.
There were also a smaller number of stoves produced simply for family use,
however, due to the high cost of materials in relation to carbon credits generated per
stove, the commercial models constitute the vast majority of stove types produced.
Buyers received subsidies for participating in the carbon offset project. Initially,
customers paid US $6 dollars less than the original price. However, after a second NGO
combined a separate voluntary carbon credit program, the subsidy on each stove purchase
was increased to approximately US $30 dollars less than the original price. This
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subsidization allowed buyers to purchase stoves at 5 - 23 percent less than the item's
original price.
In order to receive the subsidized stove price, buyers agree to sign contracts
allowing organization employees and third party auditors the ability to visit their
residences. These visits were to inspect the condition of stoves and conduct carbon
emission tests to verify reductions and their subsequent offsets. My internship allowed
me to accompany the directors on several visits to the homes of stove users. The
individuals selected for visitation owned their stoves for one to two years. The two sites
constituted a portion of the total emissions reducing stoves sold.
During my time with the organization, I visited five residences at each project
site, for ten home visits. The information from these visits is not used as evidence of
project efficacy as statistically significant sample number was not reached. Only one
home had discontinued using their improved stove altogether. This family was in a
periurban area outside a city of medium size. Three households were not using the stove
properly and had either not cleaned the chimney properly or were not providing a proper
seal around the stove body. One household was using two different models of improved
stove concurrently to boil corn and make corn mash for tortillas. I was informed that
semi-urban or rural stove owners were less likely to continue to use stoves properly,
while city dwellers had higher rates of improved stove adoption. The stove users were
often unaware of their role in a carbon offset project. A contract had been signed which
allowed the buyer to receive a subsidization of the stove's price. Those who purchased
the stove agreed to allow NGO-associated visitors to periodically conduct emissions tests
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and other stove related tasks. However, these owners had varying degrees of knowledge
regarding the role of their stove in a larger emission reduction framework.
The Contract: Small NGOs and Big Business
The carbon offset project was intended to extend for 5 years after the project's
inception. Emissions tests were to occur periodically. Stove users were to be subjected to
routine carbon credit audits to ensure offset calculations were accurate and representative
of the credits originally purchased. In the first phase of the contract, stoves were
distributed at a subsidized cost made possible through carbon credit financing.
Both the NGO and the carbon finance agency had signed a three-year contract
that was legally binding. After that point, another contract would initiate 'phase two' of
the project that would subsidize the sale of more stoves for the remaining two years of the
project. However, at the time of writing, one month after the expiration date of the
original contract, the organization had received no word from corporate representatives.
The NGO was under a great deal of stress, waiting for phase two. After hearing of the
situation, I conducted several interviews to clarify the situation.
The directors explained that they had straight forward interactions with the
corporation with whom they had originally worked. However, 6 months before the
contract was to be renewed, that corporation was purchased by another business. After
the company had changed hands, NGO-corporate relations had changed for the worse.
The NGO' corporate liaison had been abruptly dismissed and replaced. Then, the
company became unwilling to continue the contract until an unspecified later date.
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Despite the NGO repeatedly asking for more information there had been no reply from
the corporation as to future business agreements. This was causing significant stress for
the NGO which had projected an operating budget by anticipating the continuation of the
contract. In essence, the wood stove organization was placed in a vulnerable economic
position as a result the corporate donor's failure to renew the contract.
The challenge for small organizations working with large multinational corporate
funders may constitute a broad concern for the voluntary offset industry in general.
Further, there are no universally agreed upon standard regulations in the voluntary market
(Guthrnan, 2007). Carbon credit buyers must essentially trust the carbon broker to deliver
a successful development project that will offset the amount of emissions originally
calculated. In the case study observed, there was no way of knowing if the carbon offsets
in fact reduced greenhouse gas emissions because of an unexpected project termination
date.
A concern within this particular development project was one of transparency and
accountability. To strengthen the legitimacy of future carbon offsets, carbon credit sale
might be limited to after project completion of short-term agreements. There had been
concerns during the beginning stages of emissions testing even before the contract's
suspension. The third party auditing process had encountered significant hurdles.
According to the NGO, a single auditor had been sent to conduct the stove tests. He had
completed less than 10% of the total contract and conducted only one emission test of
only one of the multiple stove models sold with offset financing. The auditor was thus
unwilling or unable to conduct the remaining tests.
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Eager to receive offset financing, the local organization had employed a business
partner, a friend of the NGO, to encourage the auditor to complete the assignment. Mter
the conversation, the auditor had decided to forgo the remaining tests and agreed to teach
the emissions testing protocols to the organization's partner. The training took place and
the business partner went on to complete the remaining tests and generate the audit
report.
In the end, two individuals completed the emissions audit, one of whom was
learning while on the job. A document produced was responsible for calculating expected
savings in the quantity of GHG reduced over the project's lifetime. In the future, to avoid
possible conflicts of interest there could be greater regulations placed on the auditor's
relationship with the development organization to maintain the separation between third
party verifier and development organization. According Sterk and Bunse of the German
think tank the Wuppertal Institute, "one feature that is indispensable is the auditing of
projects by independent third parties: otherwise the compensation cannot be regarded as
credible (Taiyab, 2006; 12). The third party audit was conducted by a friend of the
organization calling into question potential conflicts of interest.
The information contained in the audit provided a theoretically representative
sample of all stove emissions, controlling for temperature, fuel moisture content,
observer's impact, personal cooking methods, and alterations in the frequency of use. The
corporation approved the data in the document and the funds were transferred to the NGO
a short time later.
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The finances provided to the NGO were a percentage of the total value of the
voluntary market's carbon credits. The sale prices for these credits have generally ranged
from 6 - 12 USD depending on the condition of the voluntary market. The prices of
voluntary offsets are determined through a variety of means. Valuation is initially set
lower for the voluntary market than for the compliance markets because of regulatory
differences and the "large volume of inexpensive agricultural sequestration offsets being
offered, which would not be permitted under the other schemes (Taiyab, 2006;28).
However, the price of voluntary carbon credits has since plummeted because of the
economic downturn in the latter half of2008. Also, in the lead up to the Copenhagen
Climate Summit which promises to have monumental impacts on emissions trading, the
voluntary market price has fallen dramatically to approximately 10 cents per credit
(CCX, 2009).
Potential explanations for the contract termination are solely speculative.
However, according to several development workers, there had been a shift in the type of
preferred projects funded by the voluntary offset market. The maj ority of carbon finance
shifted from wood and biomass stove projects and into reforestation and afforestation.
The reasons for this shift are unclear, however, the voluntary market mimics the
regulated market in many respects. Improved stove projects are not incorporated into the
Kyoto Protocol as a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). In essence there is not a
standard for measuring emissions offsets based on UNFCCC guidelines. Conversely,
forestry is included as a CDM and is considered more reliable and transparent.
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Irrespective of the politics effecting market interests, the contract between NGO
and corporation stated that all responsibility for monitoring and maintenance of the stoves
rested on the shoulders of the NGO. The organization was also responsible for replacing
broken stove parts, educating users on proper techniques, and accounting for those who
stop using the stoves for whatever reason, also known as "leakage19." After the original
contract signing, the corporation was free to sell the credits on the open market via the
Chicago Climate Exchange. The exchange is "North America's only cap and trade
system for all 6 greenhouse gases" (CCX, 2009).
Originally, the organization was able to contract a person to go door to door on a
motorcycle to check on the condition of each stove every month. The NGO was however
unable to provide replacement parts if a stove was broken. Instead, the organization could
only recommend that the stove user purchase replacement parts at the owner's expense.
The inabilities to maintain stove user performance during the lifetime of the project were
due to budgetary restrictions. The NGO's inability to provide additional parts was a
barrier to sustainable stove use and was a hindrance to project legitimacy.
After some time, the contracted individual responsible for checking on the status
of stoves was laid off. At the time of writing, no one had monitored the stoves sold under
the offset program. After the initial emissions evaluation, there was insufficient time or
financial resources to validate the initial emission audit. Neither the NGO, corporation,
nor third party auditor knew how many stoves were being used. The unknown project
19 Leakage refers to a process in which polluters may relocate their activities to another location with more
lax restrictions in order to avoid regulation (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2009).
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status may serve as a warning to those individuals and businesses interested in purchasing
carbon offsets. The project's shortcoming may also serve policy makers interested in
building a means of addressing global warming that works. If an unknown quantity of
the carbon credit market does not represent valid and known reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions than the legitimacy of the system must be reconsidered. Other factors may
also be of concern to carbon offset buyers. Among these considerations is the notion of
"additionality" which is central to the legitimacy of a carbon offset project.
Additionality Explained
Issues of 'additionality' also serve as unseen barriers to real world atmospheric
carbon reductions. As previously mentioned, the question of "additionality" is answered
by asking the question 'would this project have happened anyway?' If the answer is 'no'
the project is additional to business as usual. Additionality, in the words of World Energy
Solutions, a leading online commodity exchange is "the cornerstone of any carbon offset
project, since it proves to consumers that their purchases are making a difference" (World
Energy Solutions, 2009).
The improved wood stove manufacturing NGO had been selling stoves at
unsubsidized prices for almost a decade before the corporation became involved. It would
thus be challenging to prove the subsidized stoves were actually being used only because
of the carbon subsidization program. In other words, an argument could be made that
irrespective of carbon credit financing, people would continue to buy the stoves and use
them to save wood and reduce emissions. I was unable to sufficiently address the
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problematic issue of additionality during time spent with the wood stove producing
organization.
I asked about the problem of transparency and what it might mean for the quality
of the carbon credits. I was told by the NGO that whether the credits are legitimate or not,
they have been sold by the offset corporation. This leads to questions of legitimacy and
transparency in carbon offset development work. Is this individual carbon offset project
an isolated example of the challenges of international cap and trade? Further, who should
shoulder the responsibility of project outcomes? At present, the contracts often state that
the NGO directly participating in development work is fully responsible for outcomes.
However, according to both the wood stove manufacturing NGO and forestry
organization (Group III) the carbon credit revenues initially received for the initial were
insufficient to provide for the quantity of services expected from donors. Essentially, both
these NGOs expressed some indignation from working with emission offset financers.
Frustrations from the forestry based NGO (Group III) centered on the insufficient amount
of money given for services received. The stove producing organization had relied on
carbon financing yet the contract had been unexpectedly terminated leaving the NGO in a
difficult position.
Should the price of voluntary carbon credits be increased to provide NGOs with a
realistic amount of revenue for the entire project? Should the carbon credit broker and
NGO share equally in the responsibility for project outcomes? Would the system of
carbon credits be more reliable if offsets were sold only after the completion of the
development project? These are challenging questions to answer and it is not within the
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scope of this paper to fully address these concerns. There are however, significant
outstanding challenges within the voluntary market that are described through first hand
experience. The dilemmas described in both case studies attempt to address issues of
responsibility, ethics, and the real world impact of development. These concerns have
been raised by some scholars, environmentalists and marginalized communities. Despite
the challenges, each issue must be addressed if there is to be a functional and egalitarian
system of emissions trading.
Case Study 2: Conclusion
Many interesting features about the previous development project illuminate some
of the challenges to the current voluntary market. The root causes of these challenges
may be framed as structural or economic in nature. Contractual agreements may lose
validity if corporate project oversight does not remain constant. In other words, if a
corporation that sponsors carbon offsets is bought or sold midway through a development
project there is need for continuity in donor support in order to maintain the legitimacy of
carbon offsets.
In addition, corporate donors who sponsor offset projects may be under
tremendous pressure from shareholders to produce quarterly growth and returns for the
corporation. The market driven nature of cap and trade may perpetuate short-term
corporate cost saving measures that do not support long-term growth. In this case, a
corporation's failure to renew carbon emissions trading contracts may be viewed as a cost
saving measure because carbon credits are generated and often sold at the beginning of
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the project. Further, there may be little desire on the part of the donor to confirm project
legitimacy because, short of a negative PR backlash due to failure, there is no legal
obligation for the donor to ensure project success under this type of contract.
Other factors, which are not addressed by the current voluntary market relate to
calculating the emissions generated during the production of the improved stove units.
Greenhouse gases are released during the process of building stoves. The production of
metal and paint is needed in stove construction as well as the fabrication, shipping, and
eventual recycling of the stove itself. The emission producing materials just listed go
unquantified within the voluntary carbon offset equation. Irrespective of the above
mentioned aspects of stove production, the voluntary market does not currently recognize
the GHG emissions released in the manufacturing process of improved stoves. A full
system analysis of the greenhouse gases released in the process of stove construction is
recommended to obtain more accurate emission reduction calculations for this type of
development project.
Calculating the GHGs released during the monitoring process would also provide
increased accuracy in total emissions. For example emissions generated by development
workers and the motorcycle monitor during household stove visits certainly create
greenhouse gases. The lack of calculating the entire project's emissions signifies that
there lines have been arbitrarily been drawn to provide traction for carbon offset
scenarios. In other words, emission offset projects may foster a focus on only the specific
activities used to reduce emissions, while systematically excluding the actual emissions
generated from all activities associated with development work. Further research may be
directed towards measuring the emissions released in the production of carbon offset
projects including windmills and dam construction to provide a more accurate 'carbon
footprint. '
As previously stated, the NGO was responsible for the huge task of monitoring
the project. This presented significant challenges for the organization. To increase the
likelihood of project success, the market may be forced to adjust the price of carbon
credits to reflect true long term sustained program costs.
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CHAPTER VI
EXPLANATION OF FINDINGS AND SIGNIFICANCE
The concrete impacts of improved stove projects remain unknown. According to
one NGO employee, the subsidization of the price of cook stoves has often hindered
project success. When people in the developing world are given items through full
subsidization, the projects often fail. When individuals are asked to pay less for an item,
the outcome is often less sustainable. However, this may not be the case for the poorest
communities (Barnes, Openshaw, Smith, & Van Der Plas, 1994;24).
The voluntary market, lacking international accreditation under the Kyoto
Protocol, may be unable to supply any real tangible environmental services. In the
absence of quantified real world impacts, the carbon credit industry relies heavily on
development narratives. In the improved wood stove case study, corporate carbon sellers
relied on stories of improved indoor air quality and reduced infant mortality to sell carbon
credits. Within the context of afforestation projects, pictures showing lush jungles and
exotic animals, or social benefits to poor communities are employed. Both the World
Bank monoculture afforestation project and the small scale NGO surveyed participated in
constructing narratives using these three elements listed above.
The regulated carbon market has significant challenges due to a lengthy review
process, significant bureaucracy, and the often-daunting cost of registering offset
projects. Having a carbon offset project accepted by the Clean Development Mechanism
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Executive Board can cost as much as us $350 thousand dollars (Bayon, R, Hawn, A., &
Hamilton, K. 2009;14). The NGOs surveyed stated that the process of verification
through the compliance market was too complex for their organization. The Kyoto
mechanisms could be seen as tacitly excluding small organizations from participating in
the regulated market.
Some have termed carbon offsetting as "Enron environmentalism," due to
complex accounting practices often used to calculate emission reduction credits (Kronick,
2009). Why does a market exist for intangible carbon offset products? Diana Liverman, a
Professor at Oxford University, examines the issue ofthe commodification of
environmental services. Liverman identifies and describes three types of narratives
generated by carbon offset dealers to cater to particular situated consumer sensibilities.
The three types of narratives employed are the "quick fix for the planet, global-local
connections and avoiding the unavoidable." (Lovell, et. aI, 2009;8). Liverman and
coauthors go on to articulate how the production and consumption of carbon credits is an
essential part of the carbon trading market. Marketing processes reify the intangible
commodity that carbon credits represent. Businesses employ the zeitgeist of particular
consumer and corporate preferences to sell this new product.
Afforestation projects within the voluntary market prioritize wood fiber
production over native species diversity, forest health, and local access to land. The
prioritization of the voluntary market comes in the form of the commodification of
environmental services that provides economic incentives for more rapid growth, often at
the expense of other factors. The trend towards the commodification of the forestry
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projects as 'wood producers' and 'carbon sinks' may fail to incorporate species diversity,
water purification and local resource access into project goals. "Impartial" or "objective"
development methodologies must be situated into a larger historical processes and places
within a political economy that recognizes power disparities between industrialized and
developing nations.
Recommendations
The corporation or entity responsible for brokering a carbon credit transaction
essentially 'privatizes' the emotive power of the development project's story under the
current system of voluntary emissions trading. In other words, the owner of the carbon
credit essentially owns a project narrative with social and environmental benefits for
those in the developing world. The story may be used by a carbon trader to sell
consumers over-the-counter offsets, or to a corporate polluter in the US.
A carbon credit dealer in the voluntary market leverages human emotions with
development narratives. The dealer simultaneously 'socializes' the risk ofproject failure
on the shoulders of the development organization and the other living creatures on the
planet. In essence, privatizing monetary profits and socializing planetary risks and losses
is the paradigm. If, for example, a project is found to be illegitimate, the corporate donor
may simply claim ignorance and rely on the carbon offset contract to prove which party
is accountable. Additionally, the actual carbon offset may have changed hands multiple
times further confusing the situation. In short, cap and trade, and the voluntary market in
particular, may appear to offer cost effective ways in which to avoid changes in resource
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consumption and production in the Global North. In spite of this and from the perspective
of environmental sustainability there is a need for greater accountability and a power shift
away from carbon brokers to foster a more equitable interaction between actors. I make
several recommendations below.
Needed are greater levels of responsibility sharing between carbon financers and
those organizations that carry out projects on the ground. If western nations are to
commoditize the environmental commons and make decisions affecting the global
climate, there must be responsibility for projects that do not go according to plan. In other
words, if monetary profits from carbon trading are privatized, so to should be the losses.
Conclusion
The paper's overarching goal is not to defraud the important development projects
under review. In fact, throughout field research I was impressed with both NGO's
abilities to foster on the ground sustainable development solutions while utilizing scant
resources. The accomplishments and social impacts of integrating carbon finance into
these projects are less clear. Measuring emission reductions relating to improved stove
projects are at best inexact, leading to questionable quality carbon credits. Further,
powerful market mechanisms are influencing the ways in which carbon financed
development projects are conducted.
Publicly traded corporations experience external pressure from shareholders to
produce quarterly financial growth. Internal management pressure, currency inflation,
and competition may also force high mid level management to prioritize decisions based
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on capital expansion rather than project quality and legitimacy. This market driven model
fosters an accounting framework that conceptualizes environment degradation as
"externalities" that traditionally go unrecorded while privatizing profits (Brook, 2001).
Broad changes to energy use must occur in the Global North. Extremely complex
international emissions trading mechanisms with marginal levels of transparency are less
reliable than intra-national level changes that have long term benefits.
Tree plantations use land for 'environmental services' for developed nations. Tree
farms are often former cattle ranches, agricultural lands, or tropical rainforest. Land that
may have been beneficial to local communities for subsistence uses may become less
available because of private corporate mono-crops. In addition to privatization of land,
we witness the privatization of the 'atmospheric commons.' In other words, the
'ownership of pollution rights' as a commodity, lies at the heart of the cap and trade
debate. The political economy of voluntary carbon trading thus centers on power and
access to polluting the atmosphere.
What the paper has demonstrated is that carbon offsetting-in its present form-
only increases global wealth and power disparities. Those organizations that support
carbon trading also stand to benefit by continued access to pollution rights. Additionally,
private businesses also procure potentially lucrative financial commodities with
compelling social or ecological narratives (Lovell, Bulkeley, & Liverman, 2009 in press).
Efforts to increase transparency of carbon offsetting may have a beneficial impact
on the public's impression of global efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Climate
change legislation and policies influence everyone on the planet, particularly those in the
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developing world, less able to adapt to ecological changes. Unfortunately, not all
impacted by voluntary and compliance UNFCCC policies will have the opportunity to
voice their opinions and interests on the matter.
Global warming mitigation strategies must be legitimate in the eyes of the public
in both the global North and South. Those in the developing world where the majority of
GHG mitigation projects take place must directly benefit from carbon offsetting schemes
if there is to be lasting change. Those who use improved stove technologies should also
share in the monetary profits generated by the carbon credits they produce.
Both improved stove and afforestation projects are valuable projects that stand
alone irrespective of carbon finance in benefiting human health and environmental
preservation. Improved stoves are capable of significantly reducing fuel consumption
while improving human health and indoor air quality (Smith, 1999). Afforestation
projects also significantly reduce logging pressures on native forest reserves while
providing opportunities for future local livelihoods through ecotourism and
environmental resource protection (Satyanarayana, 2008).
There is the risk of potentially underrepresenting the importance and social
impact of development projects when carbon credits become integrated. This risk occurs
when international interest in global warming mitigation programs eclipses other aspects
of international development projects. Carbon offsets have been useful from a project-
funding standpoint. However, traditional development work may be framed as 'global
warming mitigation' by NGO fundraisers looking for ways to sponsor their work.
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From an instrumentalist standpoint, NGOs that seek funding by using the 'hot
topic' of global warming may act as a pragmatic solution. Yet, within a larger political
and economic framework organizations from developing nations are allowing carbon
financers to expropriate beneficial environmental and social narratives for pennies on the
dollar ofthe real cost of doing development. Narratives refer to the stories used to
promote development to external parties including potential project donors. An example
of carbon dealers 'harvesting narratives' may be found in advertisements of carbon offset
businesses. These narratives stress the real environmental risks of dangerous climate
change and support lifestyle adjustments, in conjunction with emission offsetting. One
offset company named Native Energy tells consumers "we'll do the dirty work,
NativeEnergy makes it easy for you to do your part to contribute to global warming
solutions and help communities in need create sustainable economic benefits" (2009).
The subtext to this statement must be unpacked. The underlying assertion is that
consumerism is capable of providing easy and convenient solutions to dangerous climate
change.
The voluntary carbon offset market has been characterized as 'environmental
greenwash,' 'Enron environmentalism,' or as a wholly fraudulent activity. This thesis has
argued that the current models of voluntary carbon offsetting are incompatible with
sustainable development. A primary reason for the success of cap and trade is that the
model is the most market friendly approach to addressing global warming. However,
conventional development narratives are responsible for creating the environmental crisis
and are not likely to have generated lasting solutions to dangerous climate change.
99
This paper has described the key players and competing interests working within
the rapidly evolving carbon trading market instead of being for or against carbon
offsetting. These interests include NGOs, corporate funders, and third party auditors.
Both projects analyzed clearly have beneficial impacts, both environmentally and
socially. However, cap and trade supports a developmentalist paradigm that continues a
system of power relations between North and South. The model is environmentally
unsustainable and perpetuates cultural and ecological degradation through privatization
of land, seeds, and pollution rights. Those who desire straightforward social and
environmental approaches should oppose the cap and trade model.
Corporations functioning under profit driven systems are ill equipped to shoulder
the responsibility of long-term complex development work. In this regard, corporations
seem well aware of the capitalist market's failure to address these shortcomings.
Contracts between businesses and NGOs have been written to reflect the corporations'
reluctance to accept responsibility and liability of unknown project outcomes. The
wording of carbon offset contracts essentially fosters a second type of offset: that of
'offsetting responsibility' for failed development work. Development narratives may
generate positive PR for project funders resulting in the public's false sense that climate
change is indeed being addressed.
Despite these concerns, small organizations do receive carbon financing which
allows NGOs to do more development work. However, in return the carbon credits the
offset sponsor receives immediate access to a saleable commodity as well as pollution
rights. NGOs that are struggling economically may choose to accept long-term
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responsibility and become indebted to project funders while shouldering the legally
responsibility for project outcomes. NGOs in developing nations once again provide the
land and labor base for corporate outsourcing this time providing 'environmental
services' to heavy industries. In exchange for a token contribution, businesses continue to
legally maintain the right to pollute the atmospheric commons. Carbon trading reinforces
wealth disparities between rich and poor.
In her article: Copenhagen Climate Change Summit not Merely a Seattle Do-over,
Award winning journalist Naomi Klein presents the notion that "offsets and sinks
threaten to become a resource grab of colonial proportions" (2009). Klein refers to the
privatization of atmospheric resources in the hands of multinational corporations.
Commodification of the earth's ability to regulate human and other forms of life is
conceptually transferred into the hands of capitalist market forces that perpetuated the
climate crisis. Moving beyond criticism, there are many feasible solutions being
presented by cap and trade critics.
One logical answer to the dilemma of seemingly unfair contractual agreements
between offset companies and developers would be to create more balanced contracts that
share responsibility equally between businesses and project developers. This solution
would sound promising if power were indeed shared equally between both parties. The
Global North-South dichotomy with wealth and resource disparities does not create a
level playing field for equal distribution of power. Northern countries and multinational
corporations are largely responsible for causing global warming and are the primary
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players in creating carbon offset systems. If industrialized countries construct the rules of
the game for Southern players, there is little chance of egalitarian power sharing.
There seem to be few choices available for addressing climate change. Worse,
environmental protection has become commodified to the point that efforts to 'save the
planet' are conducted through commercial markets and through consumerism, rather than
through fundamental changes to resource use patterns. In other words, the cap and trade
model encourages individuals and corporate entities with available wealth to buy their
way out of individual lifestyle changes simply through monetary transactions. In other
words, the production and consumption of emission offsets supports conventional
corporate behaviors fostering processes of production that are incompatible with
environmental sustainability.
The case study documenting the stove project demonstrates that emission
reductions, at least within the voluntary market, may have unknown GHG reductions.
Emissions trading works on a theoretical level, but in practice significant greenhouse gas
reductions may not occur due to factors previously discussed.
For project funders and development organizations seeking or receiving offset
funding, there are significant challenges. The decision seems to be either the fickle price
fluctuations or irregularities of the US voluntary market, or the bureaucratic and costly
UN sponsored CDM. The voluntary and compliance models of emission trading fail to
address underlying disparities in wealth and resource use between economies in the North
vis-a.-vis South. Industrialized nations are responsible for the heavy emphasis on the
hydrocarbons sector and continued reliance on fossil fuel inputs. Narratives meant to
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address climate change are based on uncertain scientific information about how best to
reduce or store greenhouse gases. Development experts participate in myriad competing
voluntary 'standards' claiming to be solving the global climate catastrophe.
Simultaneously, critics of carbon trading are marginalized as unproductive.
There are also fundamental flaws within the UNFCCC' Kyoto Protocol model.
Standardized methodologies do allow greater consistency in calculating emissions
metrics. However, the developed and developing world are separated into categories with
varying degrees of responsibility. Under UNFCCC guidelines, industrialized nations
whose governments have signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol fall under "Annex I" and
"Annex II" categories. Developing nations particularly Brazil, Russia, India, and China
(BRIC) are not legally bound to greenhouse gas emissions caps. These three
denominations signify each country's role in combating climate change and are "in
accordance with the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" (UNFCCC,
2009).
One glaring flaw present within the UN framework is that some nations remain
outside the framework emission caps. Rapidly growing developing nations, specifically
Brazil, Russia, India, and China's (BRIC) economies, produce huge quantities of
greenhouse gases that go unregulated and serve as a stockpile of tradable emissions
permits. The problem lies in that much of the greenhouse gas emissions produced
overseas, particularly those from China, are the result of manufacturing demands made
by markets in the Global North. In other words, global warming gases released in
developing nations are profoundly connected to foreign markets.
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China has become a convenient target for public criticism in the western media.
This criticism of Chinese environmental practices may obscure the foundational reasons
for climate change. One source asserts that "the carbon dioxide embedded in China's
exports to the United States in 2004 alone is estimated at 1.8 billion tons, equivalent to 30
percent of the US total" (Muldavin, 2007). In essence, the greenhouse gasses released in
China are fundamentally connected to US consumption and industrial demands. Further,
China's per capita emissions are only one sixth of those in the US. In other words, China
may simply be an easy target for' strategically ignorant' industrialized nations unwilling
or unable to claim responsibility for a global environmental catastrophe.
The conventional ideology that justifies that developing nations should be
provided unregulated pollution rights is founded on the notion that all countries will
progress through the same stages of development that industrialized nations passed
through. The idea is flawed for several reasons. Developing nations do not have other
resource bases to exploit as western nations once used colonies to facilitate their
modernization. Further, it is not nations in the South that are asking for the freedom to
release emissions, but the institutions of the North who stand to gain from the unequal
power relationship (Norberg-Hodge, 2008).
This thesis has aimed to document a growing market based approach to global
warming that is rooted in unequal power dynamics between local development agencies
in the Global South and corporate donors in the North. Complexity exists within each
project surveyed and should not be oversimplified. The discussion of afforestation
projects serve to illustrate that limited diversity tree farms funded by the World Bank are
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drastically different from the work of local NGGs. These differences exist as compared to
afforestation projects that plant native trees and incorporate locals into sustainable
development. These differences, including benefits to biodiversity and human subsistence
though not often commoditized under the voluntary market, serve as reminders that cap
and trade policies may overlook essential components of development.
At present, significant challenges exist that fundamentally threaten the credibility
of both the voluntary and regulated carbon offset markets. These concerns relate to the
insufficient quantity of revenues provided by corporations to NGGs for 'environmental
services' provided. Further, the quantities of greenhouse gases reduced through the wood
stove project are unknown due to a lack of empirical information. If a carbon offset
model is to be legitimate, there is a need for nonpartisan checks at each stage of the
project, from inception to completion. Further, those community members who had
purchased subsidized home cook stoves were often unaware of their involvement in a
greenhouse gas offset project.
Specific development narratives continue to shape the discourse surrounding
global warming policy. The paternalistic moral imperative to assist is written into carbon-
offset marketing to consumers or used to leverage financial support for questionable
development work. The 'anti-politics machine' of climate change mitigation policy
serves, as Ferguson points out to "depoliticize everything it touches, everywhere
whisking political realities out of site, all the while performing, almost unnoticed, its own
pre-eminently political operation" (Ferguson, 1985;xv). The 'political operations' found
in global warming policies are based on privatization of the commons and North-South
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wealth disparities. Under a guise of environmental protection, carbon finance has become
a multi-billion dollar industry that consolidates capital by privatizing pollution
regulations. The system socializes losses onto the atmospheric commons and the
'developing world' most at risk for climate change impacts.
Carbon offsetting is a means of systematically discounting the public's role in
shaping environmental policies via the creation of overly complex international trading
schemes controlled by experts and largely incomprehensible to the public. There must be
broad changes to energy use patterns that should occur on the national, rather than
international, level to ensure greater levels of transparency to more effectively address
global warming. Industrialized nations must accept greater responsibility for creating
dangerous climate change while assisting developing nations in building renewable
energy systems and working towards ending the global dependence on hydrocarbons.
Alternatives to market based approaches to climate change should seriously be
considered.
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APPENDIX A
WATER BOILING TEST FOR TRADITIONAL STOVE
This chart shows the average fuel wood consumed over the course of nine (9) tests on the
existing stove model used by the wood stove nongovernmental organization. The average
time to boil a cold pot containing 5 liters of water is 91.7 minutes while the average time
to boil water from a "hot start" is 49.9 minutes. To maintain five liters of water at a
simmer requires approximately 132 grams of wood. The entire test is known as the
"Water Boiling Test."
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The key figures on the chart above are the figures in the column titled "average." The
prototype model was approximately 26 minutes faster to boil in the cold start than the
traditional though the wood use was only 22 grams different between stove models. In
addition, the prototype model had reduced smoke emanating from the fuel magazine.
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APPENDIXB
WATER BOILING TEST FOR PROTOTYPE STOVE
Similar to the previous graph in Appendix A, this graph shows a stove prototype that has
been modified to have a larger exit chamber for smoke to escape from. The time to boil
water from a "cold start" is significantly reduced from an average time of 91.7 minutes
(traditional model) to 65.8 minutes (prototype model). The prototype model averaged
44.4 minutes during the "hot start" while the traditional model averaged approximately
49.9 minutes. During the simmer test, the prototype model used about 102 grams of wood
compared to 132 grams for the traditional model. In most respects the traditional and
prototype, models are similar. The main difference between the two stove models is the
time it takes to boil water from a cold start. The prototype model outperformed the
traditional model by an about 26 minutes while using approximately the same quantity of
wood (295 grams compared to 273 grams respectively). All Water Boiling Tests
simmered 5 liters of water for a minimum of 30 minutes.
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APPENDIXC
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Additionality: According to the Kyoto Protocol, emission reductions generated by Clean
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation project activities must be additional
to those that otherwise would occur. Additionality is established when there is a positive
difference between the emissions that occur in the baseline scenario, and the emissions
that occur in the proposed project (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2009).
Afforestation: The process of establishing and growing forests on bare or cultivated
land, which has not been forested in recent history (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2009).
Reforestation: This process increases the capacity of the land to sequester carbon by
replanting forest biomass in areas where forests have been previously harvested (Capoor
& Ambrosi, 2009).
Improved Stove: A wood or biomass cooking device that reduces emissions from
combustion by increasing thermal efficiency, reducing human exposure rates to harmful
indoor gases through a chimney or increased incendiary efficiency.
Leakage: Process by which emitters relocate activities to avoid regulation (Capoor &
Ambrosi, 2009).
Carbon credits: Carbon credits are applied to six green house gases (GHG): sulfur
hexafluoride, hydro fluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, nitrous oxide, methane and C02.
One carbon credit equates to a decrease of one metric ton of C02 (Bayon, R, Hawn, A,
& Hamilton, K. 2007).
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX): Members to the Chicago Climate Exchange make a
voluntary but legally binding commitment to reduce GHG emissions in 2010 by 6%
below a baseline period of 1998-2001.
Clean Development Mechanism CDM: "The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
defined in Article 12 of the Protocol, allows a country with an emission-reduction or
emission-limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to implement
an emission-reduction project in developing countries. Such projects can earn saleable
certified emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of C02, which
can be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets" (UNFCCC, 2008).
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Certified Emissions Reduction Credits (CER): "The clean development mechanism
allows emission-reduction projects in developing countries to earn certified emission
reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one ton of C02. CERs can be traded and
sold, and used by industrialized countries to meet a part of their targets under the
Protocol" (UJ\JFCCC, 2008).
Verified Emission Reduction Credit (VER): is not mandated by any law or regulation,
but originate from an organization's desire to take active part in climate change
mitigation efforts" (DNV, 2008).
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